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Letter from the Editor

Letter from the Editor
After another challenging yet enriching cycle, it is with
tremendous excitement that, on behalf of the Editorial Board, I
present the newest edition of the Penn History Review.
As I conclude my term as Editor-in-Chief of the Penn
History Review, I cannot help but reflect upon my time with great
fondness. I first joined the Editorial Board in the spring of
2014. Since then, I have read many submissions, collaborated
with numerous editors, and edited undergraduate history papers
that range from the elegant to the provocative. The amount of
knowledge I have gained about history, the publication process,
and ultimately, about myself, has been invaluable. Without a
doubt, the reason why my tenure on the Editorial Board has been
so positive rests upon the core tenet of the Penn History Review:
publishing the finest original and scholarly history essays. In
doing so, one can share the perspective of an author’s academic
passion, and, more specifically, for focused and well-researched
topics. This issue of the Penn History Review is no exception.
The first article in this issue is The Age of Infrastructure:
The Triumph and Tragedy of the Progressive Civil Religion, by Joseph
Kiernan. This piece highlights the political career of Senator
George W. Norris of Nebraska, who was considered a leader
of the progressive civil religion in the United States during the
mid-twentieth century. While the author provides a synopsis of
Norris’ entire political career, the paper focuses on the zenith of
Senator Norris’ work, highlighting the admirable and determined
spirit with which he championed the inception of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. Consequently, the reader will appreciate the
titanic amount of “red tape” Norris grappled with to achieve
his vision for the United States, and how the Nebraskan Senator
carved a legacy for himself in the country, both literally and
6
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figuratively.
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation: Implications
of Using Public Schools to House the Polio Vaccine Field Trial of 1954,
written by Will Schupmann, is the second article included in
this issue. This work highlights the controversy surrounding
the mass field trial overseen by the National Foundation for
Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) for young school children in an effort
to combat the life-threatening disease, poliomyelitis (polio).
Specifically, the NFIP opted to administer Jonas Salk’s new and
promising vaccine for polio in public schools, yet this decision,
in conjunction with other choices by the NFIP, had an important
impact regarding how the public perceived the field trial. Thus,
the reader will be surprised to learn how and why the NFIP was
successful in implementing its widespread inoculation program
and, more broadly, about the implications of hosting a mass field
trial in public schools.
The third paper is entitled The Emerging Storm: Sir Percy
Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement, 1934-1935, by Otto
Kienitz. The paper begins by introducing Sir Percy Loraine,
who in 1934 became Britain’s new Ambassador to the Republic
of Turkey. After examining the geopolitical landscape of the
interwar era, the author describes the diplomatic, economic, and
security challenges faced by Loraine in the British Ambassador’s
attempt to recommence a mutually steadfast and respectful
relationship between Britain and Turkey. By revealing the
private conversations and meetings between Loraine and various
Turkish officials to the reader, the author not only underscores
the strenuous and lethargic process of this diplomacy in general,
but also emphasizes the success, impact, and significance of
Loraine’s ambassadorial endeavors in particular.
The final scholarly essay featured is “Indianizing the
Confederacy”: Understandings of War Cruelty During the American Civil
War and the Sioux Uprising of 1862, written by Zachary Brown
of Stanford University. After defining the characteristics of
Penn History Review
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the phenomenon known as “Indian war,” this paper explores
how the northern press pinned these negative traits to their
adversaries in the South and the Minnesota Frontier during the
early- to mid-1860s. Although the northern media’s decision
seemed to transpire as a consequence of extreme and often
hyperbolized instances, these accusations persuaded and unified a
horrified and appalled audience. Ultimately, therefore, the reader
will grasp the power and impact of the northern press during
this tumultuous and sanguinary era, especially regarding how
propaganda connected and influenced the Union’s perception
of its enemy combatants.
Publishing a scholarly journal requires a team effort, thus
the Editorial Board would also like to extend its sincere thanks to
Dr. Siyen Fei, Undergraduate Chair of the History Department,
and to Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Undergraduate Advisor of
the History Department. Their advice, encouragement, and
promotion of the Penn History Review demonstrates the support
and commitment of the History Department in publishing
outstanding original and scholarly work written by undergraduate
students. Also, the Editorial Board would like to express its
gratitude for both the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania
and at other schools across the United States who advertised
this publication to students, as well as to the students who
submitted work for consideration. Finally, the Editorial Board
wishes a heartfelt thank you to the University of Pennsylvania
for providing a platform to augment and to enhance the field of
history with unique academic texts.
On a more personal note, I would like to thank the
members of the Editorial Board for their efforts, enthusiasm,
and dedication to publishing this issue of the Penn History Review.
In particular, it is with great pleasure to have added three new
members to our Editorial Board—Isabel Gendler, Emma
Hetrick, and Cristina Urquidi; they are assets to our team. Lastly,
I want to offer my appreciation to my friends and family, whose
8
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motivation and support has been immeasurable.
Congratulations to all of the editors and authors who
have contributed to this Fall 2016 Issue of the Penn History Review!

Aaron C. Mandelbaum
Editor-in-Chief
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The Age of Infrastructure

Propoganda Poster from the Second World War
Celebrating the Force and Magnitude of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Ten Years After its Inception
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The Age of Infrastructure:
The Triumph and Tragedy of the
Progressive Civil Religion
Joseph Kiernan
“And what is faith? It is not born solely or largely by the actions
of one but through the contributions of millions living in the
spirit of justice, with due consideration for the burdens and
rights of all others.”
– Senator George W. Norris (R-NE)1
INTRODUCTION
During the 1930s, simmering progressivism erupted
into furious activity, initiating the Age of Infrastructure in the
United States of America (U.S.). After decades of piecemeal
development of roads and railways at the hands of states and
private corporations, Washington, D.C. took command. Gone
were the railroad cabals of Charles Crocker, James J. Hill, Mark
Hopkins, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius
Vanderbilt. Now, economic crisis and rural poverty had galvanized
unprecedented popular support for government intervention.
Under the guidance of ideological heavyweights, the federal
government seized the reins of infrastructure development
in the United States, fusing decades of stewing resentment of
corporate greed with a New Deal checkbook. Commissions,
rather than corporations, laid asphalt, hung wire, bridged valleys,
and dammed rivers. It was an era in which men of a singular,
unstoppable vision—David Lilienthal, George W. Norris, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt—acquired the means to substantiate their
dreams.
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Thus, this is the story of Senator George W. Norris, a
Republican from Nebraska, who fought to expand government
to an unprecedented level in his crusade against poverty and
injustice. The bane of the imperious Speaker Joseph Cannon
(R-IL), Norris took on distinguished industrialist Henry Ford
and won. Norris also challenged his own political party with his
unyielding beliefs, leaving a legacy of concrete and light.
In his devotion to the progressive cause, Norris earned
no shortage of foes. Consequently, this is also the story of his
opponent, a Democrat-turned-Republican named Wendell
Willkie of Indiana, who fought Norris and the Senator’s creation,
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in an effort to protect
free enterprise from government coercion. Willkie, armed with
a passion that earned him national notoriety and widespread
respect, sought to check the excesses of the “progressive civil
religion of infrastructure” when its adherents, empowered by
the government, began to infringe on the fundamental values of
freedom. The TVA survives as an enduring symbol of the New
Deal, but its roots reached deeper than the Executive Branch’s
campaign against the blight of the Great Depression (19291939).
The progressive civil religion did not emerge ex nihilo in
the tempestuous first hundred days of the New Deal. Its origins
were older, growing in the Great Plains among disaffected farmers
and in the parlors of Boston’s Brahmins. Its adherents ranged
from the Protestant Nebraskans who sent George W. Norris to
Congress for almost forty years, even when he committed the
most egregious of political heresies, to the social reforming elite
of Manhattan, who handed a young, brilliant civil servant named
Robert Moses the power to reshape their world. The progressive
civil religion took many shapes such as, inter alia, the campaigns
of trustbusters and yellow journalists to curb corporate power,
the conservationism of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford
Pinchot, and Social Security. However, in doing so, the New Deal
empowered a unique strain of the ecumenical progressive civil
12
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religion: a progressive crusade for infrastructure. This was the
faith of Norris, mixing agrarian nationalism, progressivism, and
populism with a deep distrust of capitalism and an unrelenting
confidence in the altruistic potential of government.2 This radical
denomination, the constant frustration of internationalists and
free marketers, was built on a core belief that the government’s
role was not only to moderate and to regulate the excesses of
American capitalists, but also to serve as the egalitarian vanguard
of a better, fairer society.
In the pursuit of its agenda, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s administration handed the instruments of state to
men such as Norris to build infrastructure for the American
people and to engineer a new society. When unchecked, the
progressive civil religion led down a dark road to paternalism and
arrogant trampling of core American economic freedoms. At its
worst, the progressive civil religion of infrastructure was a selfrighteous crusade for a moral, just society that denigrated the
folly of individualism and the American belief in productive selfadvancement. However, when moderated by legitimate criticism
and motivated by unflagging commitment to the national need,
this liberal creed could master the natural power of the United
States for the common good, and uplift millions to the American
Dream. Its prophets seized upon a unique moment in American
history, carving the physical scripture of this populist faith into
the land for posterity.
THE ROAD TO MUSCLE SHOALS
The series of events that led to the birth of the TVA
began far across the Pacific Ocean in the tense summer months
of 1914. The spiraling diplomatic crisis in Europe spurred
tensions that reverberated throughout the Kaiser’s Pacific
possessions. As war threatened to break out across Europe,
German Vice-Admiral Maximillian Reichsgraf von Spee, on tour
with the battleships SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau en route
Penn History Review
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to Truk in Micronesia, contemplated the options for his fleet,
the German East Asian Cruiser Squadron. Should the pressures
of the summer erupt into armed conflict, Germany would have
limited naval resources abroad to defend its Pacific possessions.
The Triple Entente Powers, especially Britain and her
bilateral ally Japan, had relative naval superiority in the Asian
Pacific Rim. Ultimately, when the July Crisis degraded into the
inception of the First World War (1914-1918) in August, Spee
opted to sail towards South America, seeking neutral colliers
and plotting a path back towards the Fatherland. British and
American naval strategists eyed Spee’s voyage with concern as
the Germans cruised toward Cape Horn, Chile. Although the
East Asian flotilla faced defeat at the hands of the British Royal
Navy off the Falkland Islands, the German escapades in the
Pacific, combined with the privateering cruiser SMS Emden’s
activities near British India, unnerved the Triple Entente Powers.
The German naval presence off the Chilean coast raised
concerns in the United States, a neutral but nervous power.3 At
the time, Chile was the major exporter of nitrates to the U.S.,
critical for producing fertilizers and explosives, both resources
of profound strategic importance. In the arid northern reaches
of the long littoral country, huge nitrate deposits at Antofagasta
and Tarapacá attracted foreign firms from Britain, Germany,
and the United States to harvest this vital ingredient for modern
agriculture and weaponry.4
With the advent of hostilities, the Germans, now cut off
from global trade by the British blockade, developed nitrogen
fixation methods (the Haber process) to produce sufficient
materiel domestically. The German innovations and German
investments in hydroelectric energy to power the nitrate
production ensured a steady supply of shells for Krupp guns in
northern France. They also helped feed the hungry Reich, where
the agricultural output per acre outpaced most peer countries.5
The United States, however, had no reserve supply of nitrates,
was still reliant on Chilean imports.6 In a time of global war and
14
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commerce raiding, the sea lines of communication to Tarapacá
seemed more vulnerable than ever.
As the specter of armed conflict loomed, American
military planners fretted over the nitrate problem. On December
27, 1915, Brigadier General Crozier, the U.S. Army Chief of
Ordnance, called for the development of air-made nitrate
production in the United States. With the potential for U.S.
involvement rising, the United States’ dependency on Chile for
critical munitions became a political issue. German privateering
and heightened submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean
demonstrated how hostile maritime activity could interdict trade,
potentially debilitating American military preparedness.7
On June 3, 1916, in response to the mounting likelihood
of war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense
Act (NDA), a comprehensive bill to reorganize and modernize
the armed forces of the United States.8 The nitrate issue was
a component of the broad legislative initiative. Under pressure
from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, where business interests and
impoverished southerners backed the construction of a dam
and a nitrate plant along the Tennessee River, Senator Oscar
Underwood (D-AL) fought to include Section 124 in the NDA,
the “Nitrate Supply.” Section 124 “empowered” the President to
“determine the best, cheapest, and most available means for the
production of nitrates…upon any…river” and authorized the
Executive “to construct, maintain, and operate…dams, locks,
improvements to navigation, power houses…for the generation
of [electricity]” and “the production of nitrates.”9 Muscle
Shoals, positioned along the mighty Tennessee River, was an
ideal location. The federally-run project would direct millions of
federal dollars into the needy region and jumpstart an industrial
awakening in a significant portion of the sleepy South.
In the early twentieth century, the Tennessee Valley had not
shared in the economic prosperity brought by industrialization.
The region, following the river from its sources in western
Virginia and North Carolina, snaked from the highlands of East
Penn History Review
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Tennessee past Knoxville and Chattanooga down into northern
Alabama and Mississippi before turning northward back through
West Tennessee to join the Ohio River near Paducah, Kentucky.
Unlike the rich metallurgical mecca of the upper Ohio River and
the Great Lakes region, the Tennessee Valley was dependent on
a faltering agricultural base. From the late nineteenth century
to the 1920s and 1930s, the size of farms diminished and the
number of tenant farmers tripled as population growth and
productivity stagnated.10 Thus, for socioeconomic as well as
military reasons, Muscle Shoals seemed an ideal location for the
Section 124 nitrate plant and accompanying hydroelectric dam.
When word of the site’s selection reached northern
Alabama, thousands flocked to the Muscle Shoals/Florence
area, looking for work.11 Frantic construction on the dam and
nitrate plant proceeded as demand for fertilizer and munitions
skyrocketed with the deployment of American forces to the
Western Front in Belgium and France. However, the end of
the war and the return to normalcy ushered in congressional
attempts to rein in wartime spending, including cutting the Muscle
Shoals initiative. By March 1920, fiscal conservatives sank an
appropriations package to continue work on the project, stalling
construction indefinitely.12 The partially-completed facility would
remain dormant while national business and political forces
battled to see who would control the fate of Muscle Shoals and
the Tennessee Valley’s development. On one side, the greatest
industrialist of the country would seek to build a new Detroit on
the Tennessee River. On the other, a mustachioed lawyer from
McCook, Nebraska, would seek to stop him.
THE PROPHET FROM NEBRASKA
They called him a “son of the wild jackass,” a “radical,” a
socialist, and a scourge sent to Washington, D.C. for Nebraska’s
political schadenfreude.13 They also called him the “Fighting
Liberal,” the “pillar of the New Deal,” and “an uncompromising
16
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foe of special privilege.”14 Future President John F. Kennedy
eulogized him in Profiles in Courage (1955). Businessmen damned
his liberal tendencies. Presidents of his own political party vetoed
his bills and presidents of the other political party supported
his reelection. The people of Nebraska chose him to represent
them for forty years. To his admirers, he represented them
and Americans everywhere, and he fought with an unbridled
intensity to defend their democratic rights, to afford them
economic opportunity, and to uplift them out of poverty.15 For
his defiance, his leadership, and his uncompromising empathy,
George W. Norris is remembered as one of the greatest populist
senators in American history.

George W. Norris,
Senator from Nebraska and
Leader of the Progressive Civil Religion
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He was also the legislative champion of a faith, the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure. Acquainted with
the trials of farmers scratching a living out of the Nebraska
prairie and the ruinous consequences of capitalist speculation,
Norris maintained a deep compassion for the rural poor and a
loathing for the capitalist industrialists. His devotion to populist
progressivism bordered on zealotry. On politics and religion,
Norris once wrote, “True love for humanity is an unselfish
desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of all the people
comprising the government. I think religion is the same thing.”16
He would attack economic problems with ideological ferocity
throughout his long career on the national stage.
Nebraskans elected Norris to the U.S. House of
Representatives in 1902.17 At first, Norris played a quiet role
in Congress, serving as a dutiful Republican. However, after
five years in the House, his indignation towards the dictatorial
management style of Speaker Joseph Cannon grew and so
did his penchant for legislative rebellion. In his autobiography,
Fighting Liberal (1945), Norris reflected, “I doubt if any Speaker
in the history of Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon was.”18
Norris, therefore, decided that it was time to curtail the Speaker’s
power. In May 1908, he challenged Cannon over the BallingerPinchot controversy, diving into a pool of scandal that rocked
the nation.
Specifically, Gifford Pinchot, a favorite of conservationist
progressives and hand-picked by President Theodore Roosevelt
as the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, came into conflict with
President William Howard Taft’s Secretary of the Interior,
Richard Ballinger. Before leaving office, Roosevelt had announced
that waterpower was for the “public interest” and directed
Pinchot to reserve federal lands for hydroelectric purposes.19
However, this led to a series of escalating, and highly public,
rhetorical brawls between Pinchot and Ballinger once the new
Taft administration had settled in. When this conflict began to
divide Congress, Cannon backed Ballinger and the White House,
18

Joseph Kiernan

The Age of Infrastructure

who thought that Pinchot’s efforts were a conservationist bridge
too far.20 Conversely, Norris backed the hardline progressive
Pinchot. Eventually, Taft sacked Pinchot in January 1910, but
Norris had led an effective revolt against the Speaker by aligning
the progressives as a united front. The Ballinger-Pinchot
controversy widened the divisions between the progressives, led
by Theodore Roosevelt, and the conservatives, generally aligned
with Taft. Furthermore, the controversy helped to break the
back of Cannon’s stranglehold on the House, giving Norris a
starring role as an insurgent progressive who was willing and able
to challenge the powers of his own political party to advance his
agenda and defend his values. In hindsight, this would not be the
last time that hydropower elicited Norris to revolt.
After his successful transition to the U.S. Senate in the
1912 elections, Norris decided, once again, to buck the GOP
in support of Pinchot. In Pennsylvania’s 1914 U.S. Senate race,
Norris travelled to the state and campaigned for Pinchot against
the sitting Republican, Senator Boies Penrose.21 Interviewed
by The New York Times a few weeks before the election, Norris
remarked, “As a Republican Senator I consider it a duty to my
conscience, to decent citizenship, and populist government to
oppose with all my power the re-election of Penrose.”22 Although
Pinchot failed to defeat Penrose, Norris returned to Washington,
D.C. and began developing his position on natural resources. He
became a vigorous supporter of the Raker Act of 1913 to allow
San Francisco to create a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley,
and a spirited opponent of the private corporations which
sought to “protect” the Valley from reservoir development so
they could inhibit public control.23
Beyond the sphere of progressive domestic policy,
Norris achieved fame and infamy for his positions on the rising
tensions with Germany. A first-term member of the U.S. Senate,
he garnered harsh criticism for his unyielding opposition to
American involvement in the First World War. For example,
he went on to vote against the declaration of war in April
Penn History Review
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1914.24 Additionally, feeling that his ensuing actions incited his
constituents, Norris proposed a special recall election in March
1917 so the people could reassess their support for him after he
torpedoed an armed ship bill in the Senate through a filibuster.25
The state committee denied his request for a recall, sparing him
the public’s wrath. Norris, despite negative prognostications from
journalists and political pundits, fared well in the Republican
primary the next year and secured a victory in the 1918 general
election against Governor John H. Morehead.26
Overall, Norris’ first term in the U.S. Senate was
eventful. His ardor for progressive causes and occasional selfrighteousness were emblematic of the maverick career he would
continue for the next three decades. Senator Norris came to be
a standard-bearer for a distinctly populist, radical progressive
civil religion, a new national faith that placed great confidence in
the government’s ability to solve the ills of mankind. Historian
William Leuchtenburg described the progressive belief structure
as relying on the “Hamiltonian concept of positive government”
where actions were judged by “results achieved” rather than
“means employed.”27 Focusing on American foreign policy,
Leuchtenburg linked progressivism to imperialism. Although he
was certainly a hardline progressive, Norris was no imperialist.
His international viewpoint evoked William Jennings Bryan
rather than Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson.
Norris’ introspective progressive civil religion
foreshadowed the spirit of the 1930s. For him, the United States
could afford little of the burdens of colonial investment when
its own citizens cried out for relief. During his career, he did
not just advocate for progressivism—labor rights, agricultural
aid, and more direct democracy—he lived a progressive life of
action seeking to solve problems through political means. His
eternal focus was on the promotion of the national welfare,
often through his preferred policy bailiwick of agricultural
and infrastructural policies. Cautious of foreign entanglements
and disconnected from the progressive elites of the coasts,
20
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Norris united a robust faith in domestic progressivism with
agrarian populism. Although he had supported Wilson’s liberal
domestic policies, Norris’ strident opposition to the First World
War defined his dichotomous civil religion—staunch domestic
progressivism and national introversion. Fundamentally, Norris
sought the transformation of the regulatory liberal state to an
activist national government. He sought to turn pen strokes into
shovel-ready projects. He felt that the government must do what
private industry did not do—provide for the people. Norris’
determination was unwavering despite consistent political
setbacks, partially the result of his stubbornness. The Classical
Liberal zeitgeist of the 1920s ensured that he was Norris, the
Republican renegade. The progressive revolution of the 1930s,
the New Deal, put him on the front lines to build what he
believed in—the TVA.
FORD VERSUS NORRIS
On July 8, 1921, George W. Norris’ campaign for the TVA
began. With the federal funding drought stunting the Muscle
Shoals project, auto magnate Henry Ford submitted a proposal
to acquire the nitrate plant and dam system through a deal in
which his company would operate the facility. This offer included
a one hundred year “lease on the Wilson Dam, the No. 3 dam
and electric installation, when complete.”28 For southerners, the
Ford proposal appeared ideal. The project would be completed
and Ford would industrialize the Tennessee Valley, supposedly
bringing with him the high-paying manufacturing jobs that had
provided for thousands of families throughout the Midwest.
Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce in President Warren
G. Harding’s administration, voiced his support and admitted
that “whatever may be the result, Mr. Ford’s offer does prove
what the public associations [of the region] have contended, that
the completion of the project has a commercial value.”29 The
offer, however, required congressional action for approval first.
Penn History Review
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As the nitrate plant fell within the purview of agricultural
management, the Ford deal bill, S.3420, was sent to the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Its chairman was
Senator George W. Norris. The Ford offer and the Muscle
Shoals issue became the subjects of a lengthy series of hearings
in the Committee throughout 1922. The bill’s consideration was
complicated by the presence of competing business interests
which sought to take Muscle Shoals for themselves. Furthermore,
the ambiguous contractual language in the bill obfuscated
its potential ramifications. This led to a series of complicated
discussions peppered with civil engineering technicalities. Norris,
however, came prepared.
The testimony from the committee hearings on the
bill reveals the strong support from a number of influential
southerners for the proposed deal, especially the Alabama
delegation. It also illustrates Norris’ position on the appropriate
role for private corporations and moneyed interests in the
production of nitrates and, more importantly, electricity.30
Hearings began on February 16, 1922, when a delegation from
Tennessee led by Governor Alf Taylor arrived to testify. Taylor,
highly supportive of the Ford offer, commenced his address to
the Committee with the following statement, in which he cited
renown inventor Thomas Edison:
[Edison] said in my presence that it was impossible to
conceive the immensity of the power that could be
produced by that plant when completed, and that the
benefits to be derived to the country at large were also
inconceivable, and that Henry Ford was the man to take
hold and operate it when it was completed, because he was
an honest man, and a man of splendid judgment, and a
man who had succeeded, and a man who had the money.31
Curiously, Taylor’s speech continued with a broad appeal against
sectionalism and particularism. Perhaps aware of the geographic
22
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diversity of the sixteen committee members and knowing that
the economic benefit of the development would be concentrated
in the northern Alabama area, only relevant to Senators Pat
Harrison (D-MS) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-AL), Taylor adopted
a nationwide tone, remarking that “what is good for one section
of this Union is good for every section.”32 The memories of the
Civil War were still fresh in the minds of many. Taylor understood
that to promote regional infrastructural development, a national
justification had to be made. When Norris attempted to advance
his own legislation, he would take this lesson to heart.
Later that day, the Committee heard from Robert
Campbell, a business organizer from Johnson City, Tennessee.
Attempting to elucidate the motivation for Ford’s interest in
the project and the bill’s ambiguous language concerning the
requirement to actually produce nitrates, the Committee pressed
Mr. Campbell on what he considered to be the industrialist’s
intentions. Campbell, scrambling for answers, stated, “Mr. Ford’s
ambitions can not [sic] any longer demand money. He must
want to…build a monument.”33 Unsatisfied, the Committee
members asked Campbell whether, under the proposed statute,
Ford would be barred from transitioning to a more profitable
industry as profits from fertilizer production were capped at eight
percent. Campbell responded, “I trust Mr. Ford…You have to
trust somebody.”34 Senator John W. Harreld (R-OK), suspicious
of Ford’s motives, noted that the project was not “altruism.”35
Norris, who in June of the previous year had proposed the
creation of a “Federal Farmer’s Export Financing Corporation”
to buy crops from farmers for international resale, agreed with
Harreld’s sentiments.36 It would later become clear that in those
cases where a key national interest was concerned, Norris would
prefer to inject altruism through the government rather than
entrusting a private citizen, such as Henry Ford, to do so instead.
After a brief hiatus, the hearings resumed on April 10,
1922. Once again, the witness, this time Senator Underwood
from Alabama, argued that Ford was pursuing the deal for
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altruistic reasons. Underwood, who had a clear and compelling
interest in facilitating the industrialization of the Muscle Shoals
area through Ford’s proposal, opined with saccharine hyperbole.
After lambasting opponents of the deal, Underwood orated that
“[Ford] is prepared to do a great patriotic act for the people
of the United States by limiting the amount of his profits and
producing fertilizer for them as cheaply as possible.”37
When the President of the Alabama Power Company,
Thomas W. Martin, came to testify on April 11 and April 18,
Chairman Norris asked why Alabama power customers faced
such high prices and massive discrepancies in kilowatt prices.38
Norris noted that “there is something wrong if [Alabama
municipalities] pay you for their electricity less than a cent and
sell it to their people for 12 cents.”39 Martin provided a series of
evasive answers, to which Norris provided the counterexample
of the low prices enjoyed by electricity customers in Ontario,
Canada, where the government ran the power system.40 Ontario
Hydro, which relied on extensive hydroelectric installations
along the Niagara River, would become a model for Norris as he
conducted independent research on the viability of a governmentrun power generation and distribution corporation.41
By May 1, Norris’ patience for Fordists and corporate
envoys was wearing thin. William B. Mayo, Chief Engineer of the
Ford Motor Company, arrived to testify before the Committee.
Norris, unsatisfied with the ambiguity of answers on Ford’s
ultimate intentions for the plant and dams, was concerned that
the industrialist would exploit the contract’s loopholes to dupe
the government.42 After an endless series of inane prevarications
from Mayo, Norris’ tolerance expired and he interjected, “I have
been wondering, Mr. Mayo, why is it that, representing Mr. Ford,
you are not willing to take the committee and the Congress into
your full confidence and let them know just exactly what you
expect to do with this power if you get it.”43 Norris continued
with his critical rhetoric against private, corporate infrastructure
improvements.44 The ongoing testimonials failed to allay his
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fears that once Henry Ford died, the company would repurpose
the nitrate facility. Questioning the chairman of the Tennessee
River Improvement Association Executive Committee, J.W.
Worthington, Norris expressed his irritation that businessmen
expected the government to grant Ford a carte blanche and trust
that his motives aligned with the public interest. Norris remarked,
“But [Ford] is not the only man in the country that is good,
although he may be one of the best of them.”45
Considering Muscle Shoals a matter of national
importance, Norris sparred with Worthington, alleging that
it was the government’s role to protect the people from Ford.
Worthington shot back at the Chairman, quipping, “The people
of this country don’t want to be saved.”46 With that incendiary
remark, Worthington touched upon a major component of
Norris’ progressive American civil religion. Norris believed that
the people needed protection from the profit-driven capitalist
class, including Henry Ford, who would use any opportunity to
price, gouge, profiteer, or pilfer. To that end, Norris maintained
a conviction that it was the government’s role to intervene or
preempt to safeguard the public welfare. Conservatives would
probably have agreed with Worthington, portraying Norris as
self-righteous. But the exchange with Worthington revealed
the Nebraska Senator’s faith that Norris knew what the people
needed even if they did not, for he knew how to protect them
from the dangers of antidemocratic capitalist elites, and he
knew that government must be the shield. These convictions
undergirded Norris’ political philosophy.
A New York Times article from May 10, 1922, captured
Norris’ opposition to the Ford deal. Norris remarked that he
would permit “no corporation” to take over the Muscle Shoals
properties and felt that the bill included an “unconscionable
contract.”47 Agreeing with a statement from the Merchant’s
Association on a prior Ford offer to the Secretary of War, Norris
believed that a deal with a corporation on Muscle Shoals would
represent a major loss for the government.48 Four days earlier on
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May 6, Norris once again lost his temper in an interaction with
a business representative from the Air Nitrates Corporation.
Expressing similar sentiments to his comments in April, Norris
remarked:
You haven’t any assurance that this corporation will
benefit the people one iota, and you cannot demonstrate
it or show it, and that is where the curse comes in. It
will be just like any other corporation. It will be owned
by somebody else and will be manipulated just the same
as the International Harvester Co. has been manipulated
and is being manipulated right now, and the farmer will
not be helped any.49
With a keen interest in the benefits of hydropower
and cheap fertilizer for American farmers, Norris saw Muscle
Shoals as an opportunity to replenish the ruined soils of the
impoverished Tennessee Valley and to give the people access to
affordable electricity. Residents and business interests in the region
were eager for the government to complete the dam project for
energy generation and navigation purposes. However, the cagy
testimony of the parade of corporate officials and the weakness
of the government position in S.3420 convinced Norris that it
must be Washington, D.C., not Wall Street, to assume leadership
at Muscle Shoals. Therefore, Norris launched his own effort,
proposing a government-controlled corporation.
Throughout the hearings, Norris blamed pro-Ford
propaganda for the strong public support for the bill’s passage.
Norris’ opposition to the Ford proposal earned him many
enemies throughout the South, where he was burned in effigy
for halting development along the Tennessee River.50 Senators
Charles McNary (R-OR) and Norris clashed with their
Democratic colleagues, Alabamians Heflin and Underwood, in
a continuous war of words.51 The tensions did not abate during
the following years. Heflin called Norris’ 1924 Muscle Shoals
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bill “Bolshevistic.”52 Residents of the region were furious with
Norris. However, the Teapot Dome Scandal galvanized public
outrage at the apparent collusion of government and private
companies to ravage national natural resources.53 On July 15,
1922, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry rejected
the Ford proposal by a vote of nine to seven.54 The Committee
also halted Norris’ government-controlled proposal by a vote of
nine to five.55 Both proposals later went to the Senate floor as
minority reports.
Throughout the entirety of the Muscle Shoals debate,
Norris couched his arguments and opinions in his progressive
civil religious attitude. Once, he remarked that government was
a “religion that does not consider the conditions which exist
beyond the grave but confines its consideration to happiness in
this life.”56 For Norris, the problem with corporate leadership
in matters of national interest returned to the initial point
established by Senator Harreld: altruism. The Nebraskan
Senator held a deep suspicion of business motives, as shown by
his intense interrogation of corporate witnesses, and believed,
rightfully or not, that any “damn corporation” would exploit the
government and the people in the pursuit of profit, regardless of
the consequences.57
After the hearings and aware of the economic situation
facing the region, Norris envisioned a vanguard role for the
government in the Tennessee Valley. The 1920s would be marked
by his repeated attempts to push his legislative proposals, the
forerunners to the TVA, through Congress and into law. Always
a renegade, Norris would take on the succession of presidents
of his own political party to realize this vision.
THE REPUBLICAN REBEL
In June 1925, George F. Milton, a reporter for The
Independent, described the Tennessee Valley as “the Ruhr of
America,” an allusion to the heartland of German industrial
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strength. However, unlike its German counterpart, the Tennessee
Valley languished in poverty and underdevelopment. Also, unlike
the Ruhr, the Tennessee Valley, which Milton projected to be
“the very heart of industrial America,” still had not resolved the
political impediments to its economic salvation. The Wilson Dam
in Muscle Shoals was completed that year, but the hydroelectric,
fertilizer, and progressive (Norris) interests had opposing views
on what to do with its electricity.58 As Milton attests, the people
understood that “the Tennessee River is rightly a national
institution,” and Norris thought that national institutions should
be controlled by their owners, the citizens of the United States.59
Throughout the 1920s, Norris waged a successful
legislative war of attrition against conservative adversaries to gain
public control of Muscle Shoals. Not only did Norris fight for a
comprehensive, government-led effort, but he also campaigned
to derail Senator Underwood’s attempts to pass legislation
that merely focused on fertilizer production. Furthermore, in
December 1924, Norris denounced President Calvin Coolidge’s
alleged attempt to cede Muscle Shoals to the “water power trust.”
He argued that the President’s intent was to deliver to Wall Street
“a concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome [Scandal]
look like a pinhead.”60 In doing so though, Norris’ attacks
spawned strange political bedfellows as Underwood the Southern
Democrat allied with Coolidge the Massachusetts Republican
against Norris the progressive Nebraska Republican.61 For
Norris, party loyalty meant nothing compared to the national
imperative of economic development at Muscle Shoals. Also,
to Coolidge’s chagrin, Norris had backed independent Robert
“Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr. over Coolidge in the presidential
election of 1924, which surely did not endear the Senator to the
new President.62 Underwood subsequently defended Coolidge
and branded Norris as a “Populist” demagogue.63 Although they
were defeated, Coolidge and Underwood would exact vengeance
when Norris’ own proposals reached the Senate floor soon
afterward.
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Norris introduced a proto-TVA bill, S.J. Res. 2147, in
January 1926, but it died in committee. However, in December
1927, Norris’ succeeding bill, S.J. Res. 46 or the “Morin-Norris
resolution,” which provided “for the completion of Dam. No.
2 at Muscle Shoals and the steam plant at Nitrate Plant No. 2,”
was passed by Congress. In a scathing attack, The Washington Post
labeled the Morin-Norris bill as “communism, pure and simple”
and “essentially un-American.”64 Unsurprisingly, Coolidge
exercised a pocket veto to kill the legislation in June 1928.65 In
response, Norris launched a furious assault against Coolidge,
threatening to break up the Republican Party and organize a
third-party Farmer-Progressive ticket to challenge the Republican
establishment in the year’s general election.66 This proved the
depth of Norris’ devotion to pro-farmer, progressive policies.
Not only did he animadvert the President as a stooge of the
“power trust,” but he also discussed a full-scale rebellion against
his own political party’s administration and the party leadership
itself. Were Norris a marginalized radical, these actions may have
seemed less unusual. However, he enjoyed respect and legislative
support throughout Congress, which made his defiance all the
more exceptional. For Norris, the call of his civil faith was too
strong to bow to Coolidge, or to any non-progressive president.
In 1928, Norris broke party ranks again and endorsed
New York Democratic Governor Al Smith for the presidency.67
Although Smith’s “wet,” Catholic background proved unpopular
with Nebraskans, Norris believed that the Governor’s
compassion for the common people warranted his support over
the free marketeering Republican challenger, Secretary Herbert
Hoover. However, Hoover’s victory ensured another unfriendly
conservative White House for Norris. With the new president
assuming office in May 1929 though, Norris tried to gain support
for his government-control effort again with a new legislative
bill, S.J. Res. 49. Indeed, the people of the Tennessee Valley
had grown tired of the government’s vacillation on the Muscle
Shoals project. As Congress turned the dam and nitrate system
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into a political football, the farmers and businessmen of the
region wished for some form of action. Even the “communist”
government-operated proposal floated by Norris, therefore, was
gaining traction.
Reporting on the situation in the Deep South from
Florence, Alabama, journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote,
“Inoculation against the idea of ‘government in business’ goes
far and deep, particularly in regions like [the Tennessee Valley],
where government does not fulfill even the humblest citizen’s
ideal of efficiency or honesty.”68 As the woe of the Great
Depression deepened, the people of the Tennessee Valley looked
to Washington, D.C. for a “second reconstruction.” Recording
the local reaction to the new legislation, McCormick observed,
“A few days after the second passage of the Norris resolution
declaring that Muscle Shoals shall be owned and operated by
the government, the valley is once more stirred by the hope
of action as by a fresh wind from the north.”69 With broad
legislative support, Norris’ bill passed Congress and headed
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Hoover’s desk.70
Like his Republican predecessor, President Hoover,
standing adamant against federal control, vetoed the bill. The
President commented that opposition to Norris’ agenda
“appears to be cause for denunciation as being in league with
the power companies.”71 A few days prior, Norris had alleged
that the power trust sought to manipulate the U.S. government
and appropriate her resources, hinting that Hoover was caught
in its corporate enchantment. Lambasting the utilities, Norris
stated, “What is the raw material of this monopoly? It is the
rivers and the brooks that flow from the mountains to the sea.
Is it not true that the people own these natural resources?”72
Not only did Norris believe that the power trust exerted undue
monopolistic influence, but he also felt that it could coerce the
media to do its bidding. When asked for a comparative example
of a private versus public system, Norris usually referred to
the Canadian public versus American private prices along the
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Niagara River. However, analyzing Ontario Hydro, journalist
Thomas Woodlock of The Wall Street Journal excoriated publicoperated power in a November 1930 article alleging that private
plants were more economical than public ones.73 The ferocity
of journalistic opposition to government-led Tennessee Valley
proposals tended to lend some credence to the Senator’s
statements that corporate power interests were colluding with
the media to halt public expansions.
Hoover’s veto infuriated Southern Democrats and
Midwestern Progressives who stood against the pro-Hoover
Northeastern Republicans. The Senate attempted an override,
but fell six votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to
do so with forty-nine votes for and thirty-four votes against.74
Authoring a long, detailed explanation for his veto, Hoover
suggested that Alabama and Tennessee could collaborate to
develop the Tennessee Valley. He did, however, voice support for
the construction of the Cove Creek (later Norris) Dam on the
Clinch River for flood regulation.75 Hoover felt that he needed

Construction of Cove Creek Dam, later renamed Norris Dam
in honor of Senator George W. Norris
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to delineate between the appropriate realms of government and
private operations. In his justification, the President remarked,
“I hesitate to contemplate the future of our institutions, of our
government and of our country if the preoccupation of its
officials is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal
opportunity, but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That
is not liberalism, it is degeneration.”76
Though businessmen and conservatives viewed Norris’
Muscle Shoals proposals as “degeneration,” the winds of political
change were blowing across the United States. The serious
economic crisis was plunging millions into poverty. In particular,
the rural poor faced the brunt of the Great Depression, a
calamity widely pinned to the excessive greed and speculation
of Wall Street financiers. As demands for government assistance
increased, allegations of socialistic planning decreased.
Furthermore, the need for basic necessities, which increasingly
included the provision of electricity, aligned with the progressive
ethos that in matters of national interest, the moral imperative
of the ends justified the unilateralism of the means. Seeing it
as a modern necessity, Norris viewed electricity as “the breath
of life of the machine age” and “essential to human activity.”77
Economic Liberals such as Hoover, Coolidge, and later, Wendell
Willkie saw electric power as a force of progress, granted to
the country through the vibrancy of American capitalism and
competition. Norris saw power as tantamount to a civil right.
PROGRESSIVISM EMPOWERED
Fresh off his victory over President Herbert Hoover in
the presidential election of 1932, President-Elect Franklin D.
Roosevelt travelled to Alabama in January 1933 to tour Muscle
Shoals. He delivered an informal speech on January 21 in
Montgomery to a crowd that included the Governor of Alabama.
Roosevelt fused reverence for Alabama’s past with his progressive
vision for the country. His message was clear. Standing in the
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“birthplace of the Confederacy,” Roosevelt outlined a bold
future for the stagnating, suffering South, painting a future of
“better opportunities and better places for living for millions” of
people through “planning.”78
As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver a furious
volley of ambitious New Deal legislation in the spring of 1933
after his inauguration, Norris worked to bring his dream to
fruition. Collaborating with Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) in
the House of Representatives, Norris developed S.J. 1272, known
as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933. According to S.J.
1272, the TVA was to be governed by a board of commissioners
selected by presidential appointment. In addition to ordering the
operation of experimental plants and laboratories for fertilizer
production, the bill authorized the TVA to “produce, distribute,
and sell electric power.”79 A New York Times article on the bill
captured the novelty and revolutionary nature of the TVA
proposal:
The 1933 edition of the Norris bill for the development
of Muscle Shoals follows the original model, with the
[TVA] tacked on. Cheap fertilizer for the farmer, cheap
light and power for the housewife. They are to be sought
by putting government, directly, into the fertilizer and
utility business, on almost a cosmic scale. The power
plants are to be made a weapon in the war on the ‘Power
Trust.’80
Norris, who had faced recalcitrant Republican opposition
during the 1920s, only received support from Roosevelt, whom
Norris had supported in the presidential election of 1932. In
April and May 1933, President Roosevelt worked to speed the
TVA bill to passage.81 In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt spoke
in the language of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure,
calling for the “return to the spirit and vision of the pioneer”
through government “planning.” He preached that it was time
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for the United States to create “a corporation clothed with the
power of Government…for the general social and economic
welfare of the Nation.”82 Where there was no hope, government
would provide. Where there was no altruism, government would
provide. The message from Roosevelt to an audience of millions
of unemployed workers and tenant farmers, therefore, evoked
the message that the government was there and ready to provide
for and safeguard its constituents.
On May 4, 1933, the TVA bill passed for the seventh
and final time with a massive congressional majority. The House
versions were less aggressive than Norris’ proposal, giving more
room for government partnerships with private firms. The
Nebraskan’s bill envisioned a TVA vertically integrated to master
the river, derive electricity from dams, and then electrify the
countryside. As usual, Norris garnered more Democratic than
Republican support for his agenda.83 His image transformed as he
brought his legislative power to bear for the President. Roosevelt
needed a torchbearer in the Senate and Norris was a true believer
in the New Deal. For Norris, the Roosevelt revolution was an
opportunity to restore the power of the people and democratize
the progress that conservatives and big businesses thought must
come from free enterprise. The TVA was a landmark change.
While progressives had sought to regulate corporate greed and
bust trusts for decades, progressive government would now
replace business in the pursuit of national progress. Thus, Norris
the “son of the wild jackass” was now Norris the New Dealer.84
Not all citizens and politicians shared the President’s
enthusiasm for the TVA or for the unprecedented breadth
of Norris’ proposal. An article in The New York Times from
April 1933 warned that the TVA should seek to develop the
region in conjunction with existing private utilities. Concerned
Norris’ proposal was too radical, the article suggested that the
House versions provided a more reasonable compromise and
consideration of the various interests with stakes in the Tennessee
Valley business:
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If the Government is to embark on this venture at all, it
is earnestly to be hoped that these saving clauses [from
the House] will be retained in the bill, and an opportunity
thus afforded the new Tennessee Valley Authority to
work out its grandiose plans in cooperation with the
utilities, rather than in cutthroat competition with them.85
Despite the article’s hope for “cooperation,” however,
the relationship between the TVA and the private utilities would
be defined by “cutthroat competition.” In fact, the seriousness of
the competition dragged the TVA’s attention from dam-building
to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the TVA’s mandate expanded,
either through statute, precedent, or unilateral decisionmaking, the private utilities’ propensity and ability to cooperate
diminished, souring and hardening into indignant animosity.
Fighting the full force of the Roosevelt administration would
prove a herculean feat, but as soon as the TVA started to act,
opposition coalesced. Nevertheless, on June 16, 1933, less than
a month after President Roosevelt signed the compromise bill,
the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated operations. The federal
government was officially in the power business.86
THE TRIUMPH OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Norris’ crusade to create the TVA was the signature
campaign of the progressive civil religion of the 1930s.
Distrustful of corporations, skeptical of state cooperation,
and concerned for many of the impoverished farmers of
rural Tennessee and Alabama, the Nebraska Senator laced his
statements and speeches with the language of progressivism. It
was the faith of the Age of Infrastructure. No longer content
to check the excesses and injustices of the free market, Norris
and his colleagues let government lead the way through planning.
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The spirit of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure went
beyond the legislative birth of the TVA and Norris’ determined
efforts—it permeated the form and function of the TVA as it
reengineered southern Appalachia.
President Roosevelt appointed a three-man Board of
Directors—David Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan, and Harcourt
Morgan—to manage the TVA and oversee its ambitious agenda.
The TVA’s plans for the region were bold. By the fall of 1944,
nine main river dams were completed and generated electricity
along the course of the Tennessee River from Fort Loudoun
Dam to Kentucky Dam, 628 miles downstream. Incorporating
the two existing dams on the Tennessee River, Wilson and Hales
Bar, the TVA built the remainder of the main river dams as well
as a number of fossil fuel power plants, a plethora of bridges,
and numerous smaller electricity-generating and storage dams
along the river’s tributaries.87 The TVA tamed the river through
the creation of massive reservoirs covering thousands of acres
and enabled navigation from Knoxville to the Gulf of Mexico.88
Norris Dam, renamed in honor of the Senator, dammed the
Clinch River, a tributary of the Tennessee River northeast of
Knoxville. Formerly known as the Cove Creek Dam, the Norris
Dam was the first line of defense against damaging floods which
devastated the Tennessee Valley, the Ohio Valley, and down to
the Mississippi River. Apart from local destruction, frequent
flooding degraded the already-depleted soil of the Tennessee
Valley.
Part of the TVA’s Norris Dam project included the
construction of a local settlement, also called Norris. The village,
a master-planned community, included communal amenities and
modern conveniences. Unlike many works camps of the Great
Depression, Norris was designed as a permanent community—the
TVA’s model community.89 Even religious life was reformulated
as a modern, ecumenical civil exercise. For example, the secular
public school was the designated place of worship for the
inhabitants of the village. While the village’s small size and rural
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milieu influenced the lack of appropriate facilities, the image of
a unified community engaging in a religious exercise fell in-line
with the vision of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure.
Individual impediments to unity were to be overcome. Every
prayer was a civil communion, and every concrete pour was
alms for a needy nation. This civil ecumenicalism produced
strident critics in the 1930s South. For example, responding
to TVA regulations on church construction, a local southern
governor admitted that he did not appreciate Norris’ progressive
ecumenicalism, identifying such practices with “communism.”90
But the TVA did not build a “godless town” in Norris, Tennessee;
it built a new universal devotion—the religion of communitarian
progress in which all citizens could share material salvation on
Earth. In his autobiography, Senator Norris admitted, “religious
prejudice is the most deeply imbued prejudice that exists in
the human heart.”91 Thus, the TVA brought the totality of life
within the public sphere, engineering egalitarianism through the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure.
Much of the TVA’s physical infrastructure also embodied
the progressive civil religious ideals of a perfectible society. To
link Knoxville to the dam and the village, the TVA built a parkway
praised by national critics for its fusion of natural beauty with
functionality.92 Under the TVA, a public work was more than a
mere concrete highway or a hydroelectric dam. Aesthetic quality
and permanence were key features, designed to maximize the
experience and welfare of the people. In every dam’s control
room, the words “Built for the People of the United States”
were emblazoned in steely letters for all to see. Progressives
of the past had sought to cordon off expanses of American
wilderness from negative human interference—conserving
in the face of capitalist progress. Progressives of the Age of
Infrastructure, however, sought to modify the world to suit their
design for the people—engineering the alternative to capitalist
progress. The architectural style of the dams and other TVA
facilities epitomized the forceful modernity that accompanied
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this governing philosophy. A mixture of brutalism, elegance,
and industrial might defined the TVA dams along the Tennessee
River and its tributaries. Art deco motifs graced turbine halls and
bold lines defined the concrete hulks slicing into the verdant hills
of East Tennessee.
The TVA’s quantitative contributions were as impressive
as its buildings. By 1938, the TVA employed 13,000 men and
women.93 By 1941, before the completion of the last several dams,
the TVA had 2,000,000 kilowatts of capacity and it had carved
out a 650-mile navigation channel along the sinuous Tennessee
River. Scholars estimated that by the end of 1943, nearly $722
million government dollars had been invested in navigation,
flood control, and power projects for the TVA, amounting to
an enormous sum. Millions of southerners drew cheap power
from the TVA grid through municipal and community local
distributors. Thousands more enjoyed the parks, lakes, and
recreational facilities built by the TVA along the winding course
of the river.94 The TVA was more than a development agency. It
became the engine for the “arsenal of democracy.”
At one point during the Second World War, the TVA
employed 42,000 workers. Its dams provided the energy for
aluminum production, vital for the United States’ air forces.
It also supplied power to a mysterious government project at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Manhattan Project engineers
harnessed the TVA’s vast electrical resources to enrich uranium
for the United States’ first atomic weapons.95 The United States
government used its investment in the TVA, along with its
hydroelectric projects along the Columbia River in the Pacific
Northwest, to beat ploughshares into swords and defeat fascism.
Writing in 1958, author John Kyle reflected on the successes
of the TVA’s new society. Describing its developmental
achievements and international fame, Kyle explained, “To many
people the world over, the Tennessee Valley Authority represents
the highest achievement of American democracy.”96
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Propoganda Poster from the Second World War
Flaunting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Tennessee Valley Authority
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN TURMOIL
The TVA’s flurry of construction did not sate Norris’
appetite for progressive development. He set his sights on
larger quarry: the Mississippi River Valley. In December 1935,
Norris, extrapolating from a former plan for a “Missouri Valley
Authority,” sought to cover half the country under the aegis of
a gargantuan government corporation.97 By 1937, his dreams
were even more expansive. Delivering a statement at the White
House Executive Office, Norris declared that “he was planning
to introduce a bill authorizing creation of an agency to build
throughout the country a system of flood control and power
plants similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.”98 Unfortunately
for Senator Norris though, his bill and his dream of a national
TVA-esque agency died in the Senate.99 Still, this disappointment
would prove the least of his worries. The enemies of the
progressive civil religion of infrastructure were coalescing.
Throughout the 1930s, private system after private system
sold out to the local municipalities and to the TVA—for example,
Tennessee Public Service Co., Tennessee Light & Power Co., West
Tennessee Power & Light Co., and Tennessee Electric Power Co.
all sold off operations to the TVA.100 While these acquisitions
expanded the TVA’s ability to reach underserved populations,
its imperious behavior provoked intense backlash from utility
companies. The adoption of the TVA model in other states was
also faltering. Plans for a New York TVA-esque agency along the
St. Lawrence River were derailed by inadequate funding measures
and lack of congressional support.101 Meanwhile, Norris’ former
secretary and Comptroller General J.R. McCarl had “sharply
questioned some of [the] TVA’s purchasing methods.” On the
defensive, therefore, the Nebraska Senator played his favorite
political card by accusing McCarl of allegiances to the “powertrust.”102
Norris, responding to these problems and other constant
challenges to the TVA’s rather limited statutory authority,
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proposed a bill to grant the TVA the explicit prerogative to
“buy up private power facilities for resale to communities
wanting a public power source.”103 His legislation also sought to
double the TVA’s bond issuing capacity.104 The TVA leadership
attempted to secure this statutory authorization for an expansion
to TVA powers in the spring of 1935. But, to its frustration,
the TVA Board found the House Military Affairs Committee,
the committee overseeing the TVA, to be less than compliant
with their wishes. The Committee tabled the House version of
Norris’ bill, supported by original TVA sponsor and committee
chairman John Jackson McSwain (D-SC).105
As the dams rose on the Tennessee River, the nation’s
attention and criticism turned to the TVA. In 1936, however,
120,000 high school debate students answered the question:
“Resolved, that all electric utilities should be governmentally
owned.” Herbert Corey, the journalist covering the event, made
no secret of his position on that matter, although he wrapped his
bias in a thin veil of manufactured impartiality: “public ownership
as a policy has failed in the Americas. It might be a necessity in the
backward European countries where the people have lacked the
intelligence and the enterprise on which industrial advancement
is based.”106 The rampant bias on both sides of the TVA issue
reflected how deeply ingrained the public versus private power
ownership issue was in the American political consciousness of
the 1930s.
Businessmen involved in the coal business were also
concerned by the TVA’s activities. Senator Norris, unreserved
in his criticism of capitalist complaints, unleashed his usual
indictments that businessmen were interfering in the national
pilgrimage to public power. During the original struggle for
the TVA’s passage, John L. Lewis, a coal executive, became one
of Norris’ targets. The Senator alleged, “Mr. Lewis’ attitude
simply demonstrated that any man who stands in the way of
human progress and seeks to prevent the use of technological
improvements is standing in his own way and blocking his
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own progress.” Norris did not elaborate on who was granted
the power to define “human progress.” Throughout the Age
of Infrastructure, Norris and his compatriots were completely
convinced that their opinions were irreproachably correct and
moral. Then, they married this unwavering confidence with
technocratic implementation. Victory, not compromise, was
the goal. Understandably, this recalcitrant orthodoxy generated
problems. The opposition to the TVA was not limited to errant
journalists soapboxing through public interest pieces or corporate
representatives. A serious and determined resistance to the TVA’s
encroachment emerged. Nevertheless, one of the TVA’s greatest
challenges was endogenous. Something was rotten in Knoxville.
The TVA’s triumvirate leadership began to disintegrate.
The problems had begun shortly after the foundation of the
TVA in 1933, though it took several years for the severity of
the dissention to permeate the public sphere. Chairman Arthur
Morgan clashed with his fellow board members David Lilienthal
and Harcourt Morgan over significant executive decisions.
What had been a private struggle, especially between Chairman
Morgan and Lilienthal, devolved into a public rhetorical brawl
when Chairman Morgan levied indictments of mismanagement
and negligence against Lilienthal. For example, Chairman
Morgan accused Lilienthal of mishandling the negotiations with
Alcoa over the Fontana Dam in North Carolina. Still, this was
only one case in a succession of outlandish accusations in which
Chairman Morgan publically directed towards Lilienthal. After
the Chairman interfered unreasonably in another spat known as
the Berry marble issue, Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan wrote
to President Roosevelt requesting that Arthur Morgan resign.107
However, Roosevelt, the only significant check on the Chairman’s
power, did nothing.
Eventually, Arthur Morgan forced the President’s
hand. After demanding a congressional investigation into the
activities of the other board members and suspicious TVA
actions, Roosevelt sacked Chairman Morgan in March 1938.
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The defamation continued during the subsequent investigation.
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan alleged that Arthur Morgan had
tried to “sabotage” the TVA as an agent of the power trust.108
Arthur Morgan shot back, making a series of charges including
“mismanagement of the power program, conspiracy, and
subservience to…special interests.”109 Throughout the summer
of 1938, Lilienthal parried attacks from Arthur Morgan and the
press, referring to the Chairman as “reckless, unreliable, and
erratic.”110
The “TVA Scandal” wrought havoc, distracting from
the completion of TVA priorities and fueling the agency’s
critics. Arthur Morgan launched a messy lawsuit only to be
defeated in the courts, further sullying his already-tainted image.
Although the scandal abated, the series of events tarnished the
TVA’s administrative record. Confidence in the governance of
appointed experts, thought to be immune to the petty politicking
of Congress and the underhanded tactics of the business elites,
was shaken. The Morgan crisis reminded Norris and the radical
New Dealers of an unpleasant reality. Many men, not just Henry
Ford, were driven by avarice and a lust for the aggregation of
power. Business, especially in the unregulated 1920s, was bluntly
motivated by profit, much to Norris’ disgust. However, despite
what Norris would have liked to have thought, government
was no monolith of unending altruism. It, like business, was
composed of men who sought to exercise a vision and the means
to power.
The strife between Arthur Morgan and his two comrades
illustrated how personal and petty concerns could derail the
holy project of the TVA. As the agency made great strides in
raising dams along the rivers and stringing transmission lines
along country roads, the TVA was bogged down in politics
and hearings, eventually necessitating intervention from the
President. Norris had handed the Board an immense amount
of institutional power backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States. The Morgan crisis proved that although the TVA
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could reshape the countryside to suit man’s desires, it could
not, even with its noble mandate, reshape those desires. It also
demonstrated that the TVA, with its unusually long nine-year
appointments for Board members, was as corruptible as any
other government institution.
WENDELL WILLKIE’S WAR
Chairman Arthur Morgan, though troublesome, was not
the greatest foe the TVA faced during the 1930s. The TVA’s rapid
expansion had generated enemies, and the power utilities grew
increasingly concerned, especially as Norris proposed ever-bolder
plans for a nationwide TVA-esque agency that would replace
private power corporations. Throughout its early years, the TVA
interacted with Commonwealth & Southern Corporation (C&S),
a major U.S. utility holding company, and its dynamic, articulate
president, Wendell Willkie. Concerned by government’s entry
into the electricity market, Willkie proved more than a match for
Lilienthal in Knoxville and Norris in Washington, D.C. as they
fought over the future of energy in the United States. Willkie
challenged the fullest expression of the progressive civil religion
of infrastructure, seeking to check the excesses of the New Deal
to preserve the competitive system that he and others felt was
so central to the United States’ economic success and culture of
individual liberty.
In modern times, Wendell Willkie is best remembered
as the Republican challenger to Roosevelt in the presidential
election of 1940. That election was notable because Roosevelt
broke with the Washingtonian tradition and marched towards an
unprecedented third term in office with a healthy lead in votes.
However, Willkie was no stooge of the Republican establishment,
nor was he a conservative purist. He was a dynamic, eloquent
candidate and the most potent foe of the TVA. Willkie was no
politician either; he was hardly even a Republican, having been a
Democrat until 1939. He was a business executive, trained as an
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Wendell Willkie,
President of Commonwealth
& Southern Corporation

attorney, and eminently successful at his work. Promoted from
counsel to president of the influential C&S in 1933, Willkie was
positioned to take control of the company just as the TVA began
organizing. More specifically, Willkie assumed authority when
the TVA was poised to develop electricity systems in a region
where the C&S already had a significant subsidiary presence.
Ironically, Willkie, a registered Democrat at the time
and a regular attendee of national party conventions, became
the champion of the anti-TVA movement. He stood against a
Republican, Senator Norris, who stridently backed every New
Deal proposal and fought for the TVA on every occasion.111
Norris’ progressive faith, which previously had confounded
partisanship, and Willkie’s defense of economic liberty, made for
strange alliances. Over the course of the 1930s, Willkie would
force Norris to shield the TVA, at the public podium and in
the Capitol. The Nebraskan had fought for more than decade
to tame the Tennessee River for the people of the United States.
Now, he would have to fight to keep it.
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The TVA entered negotiations with C&S in 1933 to
discuss a modus vivendi. In January 1934, C&S and the TVA reached
a settlement in which the TVA agreed not to enter certain areas
nor take C&S customers until a few months after the completion
of the Norris Dam. Much to the consternation of C&S, the TVA
immediately sped up construction of the dam. Meanwhile, the
TVA also strung transmission lines around cities currently served
by utility companies and offered economic incentives for those
municipalities to switch service to TVA power.112 Willkie strongly
opposed the double standards which he felt were applied to the
TVA. He argued that if the TVA was subjected to the same
“requirements binding private utilities,” it could not survive
in the marketplace. Beyond general complaints of unfairness,
Willkie’s primary concern was the TVA’s creeping mandate.
Congress tried to set limits on the scope of its powers in the
1935 bills through amendments in the appropriations package.
However, the New Deal legislators had intervened, stripping
out provisions that would have required audits, prohibited the
sale of surplus power under cost, and prevented the duplication
of transmission lines.113 Willkie, therefore, delivered a forceful
condemnation of this interference.114
In 1935, Willkie railed against the TVA “yardstick”
concept, a means to test the fairness of electricity rates, and other
TVA “frantic activity” that he viewed as designed to erode private
utilities through unfair practices.115 President Roosevelt had first
invoked the “yardstick” concept during his campaign in the
presidential election of 1932 as a means through which the TVA
could check the ability of private operators to raise prices, similar
to the discussions on rates that were seen in the Muscle Shoals
hearings in 1922.116 Indeed, the “yardstick” concept was not
included in the original TVA legislation, which troubled Willkie
and other private operators. They felt that the TVA, afforded
government advantages, would be a privileged competitor that
would gradually encroach on their businesses. This was a correct
assumption. Additionally, Willkie assumed that the trend of
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subsidizing consumers “at the expense of taxpayers” through
government intervention would, if not restrained, threaten the
entirety of the U.S. utility market.117 Furthermore, many private
operators believed that the “yardstick” concept was less of a
means of protecting consumers and more of a ploy to bludgeon
control of power systems into government hands. To be sure,
Roosevelt admitted in 1934 that “where the private interest and
this public interest conflict, the public interest must prevail.”118
Electric power had become the cynosure of debate over the
TVA.
Corporate apprehensions about the growth of the
TVA’s mandate and intentions were substantiated by the
difference between the focus of the authorizing legislation—the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933—which provided for
the precedent-supported government regulation of rivers for
navigation and flood control, and the apparent driving focus
of the TVA, supplanting private power utilities. Electric power
generation and transmission had been secondary elements of
an April 1933 Senate Committee report for the TVA bill. The
clear intention of the bill was for flood control and navigation
in the Tennessee Valley as well as the production of fertilizers at
Muscle Shoals. In fact, the report only mentions electric power in
Clause Five.119 When one reflects upon the original intent of the
National Defense Act of 1916, the scope of the transformation
is even broader. Muscle Shoals began as an effort to produce
critical nitrate for U.S. farmers and for the war effort during the
First World War. The electric power was a means to produce
that nitrate. By 1933, however, the project had evolved into a
federal power scheme. This exercise of federal prerogative was
supported with little if any precedent.
Willkie blamed overzealous New Dealers for the TVA’s
alleged overreaching. He released a statement in January 1938
alleging that the TVA was as much an effort to neuter the
private utility industry as it was to build infrastructure for the
impoverished people of the Tennessee Valley:
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There was no utility problem in the Tennessee Valley
until the Federal Government created it. As soon as
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed in June
1933, however, the Federal Government began to flood
the Tennessee Valley with both money and propaganda
on behalf of the government power projects. The
government built dams, power plants, and transmission
lines.120
Willkie, hoping to reach a workable arrangement with the TVA
that protected the core interests of C&S, had been willing to
negotiate with Lilienthal in the early days of TVA activities. As
political scientist C. Herman Pritchett notes, “Several times during
this period[,] Willkie, president of Commonwealth & Southern,
met with Lilienthal, power director of the T.V.A., and presented
suggestions for a division of areas between the two agencies.”121
However, Lilienthal was unwilling to negotiate, believing that the
accommodation of the private power interests was “contrary
to the provisions of the T.V.A. statute.”122 Whether demanding
hard territorial limits on TVA activities from Roosevelt,
litigating against the TVA over competition issues, or speaking
to the American people with “a fluency and eloquence,” Willkie
defended the principles of American free enterprise against
the power of the popular progressive civil religion.123 Willkie’s
national prominence opened his path to challenge Roosevelt
in the presidential election of 1940, by which time he finally
changed his registration to Republican.
Willkie’s war and the TVA’s internal challenges tempered
the scope of Norris’ ambitions for government-operated
utilities. Willkie reminded the American people that while
the government could advance the public good, it could also
advance it beyond appropriate, constitutional boundaries. The
political intransigence of the Muscle Shoals project in the 1920s
suffocated development in the Tennessee Valley. For the farmers
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of Alabama and Tennessee, Congress moved too slowly. The
TVA marched forward at a breakneck pace, erecting dams and
electrifying counties. For some, the TVA was moving too quickly
and without consideration for the consequences of its actions.
Some critics of Norris’ proposals had warned of
creeping socialism or bureaucratic planners run amok. Vehement
opposition to government operations in the Tennessee Valley
only served to prove the progressives’ point—the profit motive
had corrupted every echelon of society. Willkie’s strategic
criticisms and trust-building efforts were far more constructive.
He served as a necessary and natural check on the TVA. When
it erred, Willkie pointed it out. When it ran roughshod over
business interests, he illuminated the transgressions and offered
proposals. Willkie tempered the excesses of the progressive civil
religion of infrastructure. His efforts established a tenable middle
ground between Norris’ dreams of the total nationalization of
utilities and the laissez-faire economics that epitomized the
former Coolidge administration. Through that mediation, the
nation achieved a workable coexistence between governmentled progress and individual-led progress. The TVA stands as a
unique institution in the United States. Norris failed to realize his
dream of public power nationwide. However, the TVA survived
the 1930s, remaining as a robust experiment that provided cheap
power and good jobs to the people of the Tennessee Valley.
THE AGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
The Age of Infrastructure witnessed some of the
greatest public achievements in the United States. The TVA
brought power to the people, bringing a vision of hope to one
of the country’s poorest regions. It proved that government
would not forget the most vulnerable Americans. Its successes
represented the epitome of Norris’ populist progressivism—
government, as a vanguard, would build a better society through
the provision of economic empowerment. The TVA was a
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national effort, transcending the sectionalism of pettier politics.
Its foremost advocates included a plutocratic president from the
Hudson River Valley and an agrarian populist senator from the
Great Plains. For Norris, the United States was at its best when
it led by example. This informed his isolationist tendencies and
his commitment to communitarian modernism. Writing in 1944,
Norris expressed a hope for a brave, new future of American
politics:
But so long as an unselfish leadership remains for [the
American people’s] guidance—a leadership untainted
by corrupting personal ambition—a leadership inspired
by the simple strength that oozes from the soil and the
humble ranks of the poor—and at time is enriched
and fortified enormously by the support and voice of
those who wear purple robes of great wealth—I am
sure America can continue to be the bright beacon
toward which the eyes of the world’s oppressed and
downtrodden will turn for inspiration and hope.124
The greatest tragedy of Norris’ career was the dearth of
Americans who could provide the “unselfish leadership” he
desired. The destructive squabbling of the TVA triumvirs proved
that even the people’s technocracy was susceptible to the baser
demons of human nature.
The TVA’s troubles paled compared to exploitations
of progressivism by men of truly unbridled “personal
ambition.” For them, the ends always justified the means and
the Age of Infrastructure created unparalleled methods for the
materialization of their vision. Under a banner of social reform
and modernity, city planner Robert Moses, another great builder
of public works, obtained unprecedented and unchecked power
in New York. As he built an administrative empire, he cultivated
and greedily protected his autonomous authority from any
encroachment. Exploiting the ascendancy of public investment
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in infrastructure and justifying his actions under the broad
umbrella of societal progress, Moses bludgeoned any opponent
who sought, like Norris’ Willkie, to moderate his activities. With
imperious arrogance, Moses once remarked, “There are people
who like things as they are…They cannot be permitted to stand
in the way of progress.”125 As he flattened poor and minority
neighborhoods to build titanic highways, Moses meant this
statement in its most literal sense. Either the people would move
or he would move them.
The TVA’s failings and Robert Moses’ autocracy
revealed the dangers inherent to the progressive civil religion of
infrastructure.126 Intention, regardless of its moral rationalization,
did not guarantee purely altruistic governance. The overarching
theme of this political faith was a profound confidence, bordering
on arrogance, that the progressive powerbrokers knew what
was best for the people. Unwavering faith in the righteousness
of one’s opinions translated into wholesale, uncompromising
implementation and a flawed belief that one could reengineer
society to conform to their idea of a democratic utopia.
Institutions of merit without checks became the realms of the
bureaucratic oligarchy.
In forming the model of the United States’ constitutional
representative republic, James Madison recognized that
government would need to check private ambitions for the
safety of the body politic. Progressives, including Woodrow
Wilson, thought this cautious conservative form of government
obsolete for the modern age. Norris did worry about the
ambitions of men such as Henry Ford or the “power trusters,”
but he equated the threat with unbridled industrial capitalism,
not an overzealous government. Norris failed to recognize how
his own works, however well-intentioned, created new, and often
thoroughly undemocratic, avenues for the individual pursuit of
power at the public’s expense. Sadly for this “gentle knight of
American democracy,” his endless compassion for the plight of
the poor was tainted by his own naïveté.127
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Despite these setbacks, Norris’ contributions to building
American democracy were monumental. During the 1920s, his
national perspective and resolute integrity reinforced the people’s
faith in their government in an era of regionalism and endless
scandals. In the 1930s, his ideology formed the rock upon which
the New Deal was formed. Working hand-in-hand with President
Roosevelt, Norris used an economic crisis to direct Americans’
attention to people whose Great Depression began decades earlier
through a systematic pattern of neglect, underinvestment, and
environmental degradation. Through his determination, Norris
took a weapon of war, the Muscle Shoals project, and converted
it into an instrument for the public welfare. Fittingly, the TVA
would work to protect American democracy through a renewal
of equality and its defense against the forces of fascism. Senator
Norris’ strain of progressivism shunned individualism while
embracing communitarianism. It substantiated massive increases
in federal authority while illuminating the darkest of valleys. The
TVA was the public church for a new civil religion: a nationalist,
equalitarian, and materialist crusade for the betterment of the
people. Norris’ sermon was that the government’s responsibility
was the promotion of “happiness in this life” for all people,
nationwide. His mission lives on in the rivers he mastered, the
farms he electrified, and the futures he “Built for the People of
the United States.”
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Public Schools as Loci for Human
Experimentation: Implications of Using
Public Schools to House the Polio
Vaccine Field Trial of 1954
Will Schupmann
In 1954, schoolchildren all across the United States participated in one of the largest medical experiments in history.
Organized and carried out in public schools by the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, the field trial tested the safety
and efficacy of Jonas Salk’s vaccine for poliomyelitis (polio). The
trial’s success was celebrated as a stunning and revolutionary triumph of science and medicine; just two years before, Americans
had faced the largest epidemic of polio on record, permanently
paralyzing twenty-one thousand individuals, but the trial’s success signaled an end to this era.1
The story of polio in the United States is well told; there
is a great deal of scholarship on the history of polio, the experience of living with the disease, the advent of Salk’s vaccine, and
the success and legacy of the field trial.2 This paper, however,
adds to the scholarship by providing a critical perspective on the
role of public schools in shaping public perceptions of and participation in the trial. There has been no discussion to date on
how schools as institutions played a significant part in human
experimentation in the twentieth century.
Polio, and its defeat, is as thoroughly embedded in the
history of American culture as it is in the history of medicine
and public health. As historians James Colgrove and Daniel Wilson state, the image of a quadriplegic child dependent on the
iconic “iron lung” respirator was deeply ingrained in the American conscious and prompted parents to keep their children away
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from public playgrounds, swimming pools, and movie theaters
during the summertime.3 The National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis (NFIP, known as the March of Dimes today) was crucial in making the disease a media sensation year after year and
drumming up public support and funding for the development
of a vaccine.4 In addition, the fact that polio prevailed—on epidemic proportions—in such a scientifically advanced nation as
the United States also motivated the quest for a vaccine.
The use of public schools in hosting the field trial in

In this cartoon commissioned in 1943 by the U.S. Office of War Information,
the girl’s struggle with infantile paralysis (polio) is likened to the country’s
struggle in the Second World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that fighting against polio—including participating in the vaccine’s trial—assumed a
nationalistic tone. Furthermore, the cartoon attempts to instill an intense fear
of the disease in the viewer through depicting polio as monstrous.
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1954 is significant because while it was common for non-experimental vaccines to be administered in public spaces such as
schools and community centers, human experimentation was,
for the most part, carried out in clinical settings. Few historians
have examined the role of schools in the field trial, and practically no one has questioned the implications of using schools as
opposed to clinical settings for human experimentation.5 In fact,
despite public schools having been used multiple times throughout the early- to mid-twentieth century as loci for human experimentation, historians of bioethical issues have not examined this
phenomenon either.6 The most closely related scholarship in the
history of bioethics is perhaps the work examining the use of
institutionalized children (children living in orphanages or asylums), prisoners, and college and university students as research
subjects in the twentieth century.7
Thus, this paper sheds light on the implications of using
public schools as loci for the polio vaccine field trial. Indeed, the
use of public schools made the experiment appear more akin to
a mass vaccination campaign rather than what it truly was: a field
trial testing the vaccine’s safety and efficacy.
The paper begins by exploring why, despite the fact that
an explosion of experimentation following the conclusion of the
Second World War in 1945 occurred almost exclusively in hospitals, schools were used nonetheless as sites for the polio vaccine
trial. It then describes how the use of public schools altered perceptions of and participation in the trial. Conducting the trial in
a school setting as opposed to a clinical setting prevented parents
from making an informed decision on whether to allow their
children to participate because there was a dearth of adequate
information about its experimental nature. Moreover, the use of
public schools contributed to the nationalistic perception that
families had a moral obligation to participate for the utility of
one’s community and country. Furthermore, the public nature of
schools caused parents to make their decisions based in part on
what others, such as their neighbors and friends, were choosing
Penn History Review

63

Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation

to do. And finally, the authority inherent to schools and school
officials in local communities legitimized the trial as something
students should take part in. In effect, schools as public spaces
have connotations and significations quite different from those
of hospitals and doctors’ offices, and these distinctions influenced the perceptions of the polio field trial and should continue
to inform our understanding of research ethics.
CLINICAL SETTINGS AS CONVENTIONAL SPACES
FOR EXPERIMENTATION
The rise to prominence of biomedicine and the medical
profession during the early- to mid-twentieth century resulted in
a concomitant increase in human subjects research, and the clinical setting became the primary location in which cases of experimentation took place. During the early decades of the twentieth
century, research units were established in existing hospitals, and
new, research-specific hospitals were built.8 As historian Susan
Lederer notes, clinical research was such an integral part of the
medical profession and of the hospital setting by this time that
clinical investigators argued that “patients actually received better care [in research hospitals] than patients in a hospital where
research was not a priority.”9 Indeed, Lederer writes that Rufus
Cole, Director of the Hospital of the Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research in 1927, asserted that “the rich and the poor…
rushed to fill the available [research] hospital beds, because they
had learned that the best medical care was available in institutions
where patients were studied scientifically.”10 Historian David
Rothman concurs that research hospitals were where the explosion of human experimentation occurred. He states, “Subjects
were now more likely to be a group of patients in a particular
hospital rather than neighbors or kin.”11 Physicians regularly administered new drugs to sick patients in research hospitals who
were looking for anything with “therapeutic potential.”12
Given the prevalence of human subjects research carried
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out in hospitals during the early- to mid-twentieth century, it is
surprising that schools served as a site of experimentation. An
explanation may be found in how the public viewed the role of
schools in children’s health and how there was an existing relationship between schools and vaccination campaigns.
SCHOOLS AS EXISTING SITES FOR MEDICAL CARE
AND EDUCATION
Beyond providing a large, convenient supply of participants, public schools were perceived as a logical space in which
to carry out the polio vaccine field trial because they played a
significant role in the health care of children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Medical and cultural historian Richard Meckel describes how urban primary schools
were directly involved in monitoring and improving the health
of schoolchildren from around 1870 until the beginning of
the Great Depression in the late 1920s.13 Despite the fact that
around the 1930s schools shifted away from medical provision,
schools remained active as guardians of children’s health in the
mid-twentieth century, offering students health education and
acting as intermediaries between children and community health
services. In fact, schools played an important role in children’s
health when it came to polio in particular.
The role of schools and teachers in children’s health in
the 1930s is apparent from an article entitled, “Responsibility of
the Teacher for Child Health,” published in 1937 in the journal
Childhood Education, the self-described “Magazine for Teachers of
Young Children.” The author states:
Adequate health care for children represents a combination of family and community interests and responsibilities. The home is the center of the child’s life and the
parents chiefly determine what provision is made for the
health of the family. However, those responsible for edPenn History Review
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ucation of the child outside the home must of necessity
share in supporting and continuing this provision. This
can best be done in close rapport with the family, with
family-health workers, and with other specialists in the
field of child health—pediatricians, nutritionists, mental
hygienists, and dentists.14
Ensuring that a community’s children were in proper health was
a collaborative effort among parents, teachers, and health care
providers. It is telling that the article describes students as under
the “care” of their teacher, not merely the instruction.15 Teachers were charged with including in their students’ education
health behaviors that either reinforced what was being taught
at home or, more notably, supplemented or corrected what was
being taught at home. The author writes, “[The] responsibility
devolves upon the teacher for continuing the health direction
and guidance initiated in the home, and, sometimes for helping
children to establish in the school health attitudes and practices
that will stimulate parents to make more adequate health provision in the homes.”16 In other words, public schools were an opportunity for the state or for the community to actually educate
parents in addition to children on the health behaviors they should
be carrying out at home. Furthermore, teachers were instructed
to “informally” observe for signs of poor health in their interactions with students, which, given the frequency with which
they saw their students, was seen as a practical measure teachers
should take. Teachers would subsequently participate in “joint
health conference[s]” with a physician, each student, the child’s
parents, and the school nurse.17
The responsibilities of teachers in 1937 were similar to
those of teachers about a decade later, when polio epidemics
were most severe.18 An article entitled “If Polio Comes” that
was published in the National Education Association Journal in 1950
outlines what the role of teachers should be in the nation’s fight
against polio.19 The essay aimed to educate teachers about the
66

Will Schupmann

Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation

disease and point them to additional literature available from the
NFIP (including A Highschool [sic] Unit on Poliomyelitis) so that
teachers could “clear away misconceptions” of the disease in
“science classes and in contacts with parents.”20 Therefore, just
as in 1937, teachers were educated in the practices parents could
implement at home and were expected to help disseminate this
information. Teachers were also instructed to look out for symptoms of the disease and to notify parents and physicians of any
findings:
Only the teacher, aside from parents, can make a daily
check on the individual child. Even the parent does not
see a child with quite the same perspective as the teacher.
This does not mean the teacher can replace a doctor or
school nurse—it is recommended that post polio patients have a physical examination every six months for a
year or more. But the teacher has the advantage of seeing children daily at work and play in the school…The
watchful eye of a teacher who has been alerted to these
signals can be the first to detect a slight limp, an unsteadiness of hand, or a change in posture.21
Further, polio was a visible disease in part because its chronic nature meant that many of the children who were infected
still attended school (or returned after a period of time). In effect, teachers and students alike knew first-hand what the disease “looked like,” and it became something they experienced
in school. For example, Our Schools, a publication of the West
Virginia Education Association, discussed how teachers and students had a responsibility to help children infected by polio restore the convalescent’s sense of self-confidence and to “prevent
[the inflicted children from] developing an inferiority complex
and a feeling of disability.”22 Thus, schools played a significant
role in children’s health in the decades before the polio field trial,
and they also served as sources of authority and information on
Penn History Review

67

Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation

polio. In effect, it may have been perceived as logical that schools
served as spaces in which polio was defeated.
As government-owned institutions and centers for communities, public schools also served as sites for mass vaccination campaigns run by city health departments throughout the
twentieth century. For example, schools were among the locations such campaigns targeted to immunize susceptible children
against diphtheria during the 1920s. In fact, newspaper articles
from this decade report the use of schools for vaccination campaigns in cities all over the country, including Long Beach, California; Newburgh, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and
Washington, D. C.23 Vaccination campaigns against smallpox
were also located in public schools. An article from The Los Angeles Times in 1951 describes that the annual drive planned to visit
105 schools and vaccinate about 35,000 students.24 In addition to
serving as sites for vaccination campaigns, many public schools
required that their students receive vaccinations in order to attend. This requirement was deemed constitutional in 1922 as
a result of the United States Supreme Court ruling of Zucht v.
King.25 In this way, schools were not only seen as existing sites for
medical care and education, but the youngest members of the
public were also accustomed to receiving vaccinations in schools
as well as for schools.
Lastly, schools may have been perceived as the appropriate space in which to carry out the field trial because the experiment was testing a vaccine, not a medical procedure or pharmaceutical drug. In other words, hospitals served as the primary sites
for human experimentation, and these trials were conducted on
sick patients who enrolled in the research projects with the hope
of—as Rothman describes it—“therapeutic potential.” Vaccines,
however, were understood as a preventive measure that healthy
individuals could partake in to remain out of the hospital. The
manner in which the public during this time period understood
vaccines in relation to human experimentation is worth further
exploration.
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While public schools appeared to be the most logical
space in which to carry out the trial, what follows is a description
of the implications of using schools on the public’s perception
of and participation in the trial.
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION
ON THE FIELD TRIAL
Carrying out the trial in schools as opposed to clinical
settings caused the media, the NFIP, and schools to be parents’
primary sources of information, not physicians. In effect, it is
questionable as to what extent parents’ decisions in agreeing to
participate in the trial were adequately informed. While there was
a great deal of information available to parents to help them
make their decisions, these sources were primarily journalistic accounts of the trial or, essentially, propaganda from the NFIP. A
1958 study entitled, “Parental Reactions to Communications on
the 1954 Polio Vaccine Tests,” examined the sources of information parents received and concluded that beginning in 1953,
newspapers and magazines regularly contained educational articles written by journalists with titles such as “D-day Against
Polio,” “Mass Polio Tests,” “The Fight on Polio,” “Tracking the
Killer,” “The Great Test,” “Polio: At Last the End of the Crippler,” “Closing in on Polio,” “Vaccine Safety,” and “Polio Pioneers.”26 In addition, children brought home from school a letter from Basil O’Connor, President of the NFIP, explaining the
importance of participating in the trial; a leaflet explaining the
nature of the vaccine and the trial; and a consent form which
was to be filled out and returned to school.27
Based on these newspaper and magazine articles, not
surprisingly, the objectives of the trial were fairly ambiguous. Officially, the NFIP stated that the vaccine had already been proven
safe and that the field trial was merely validating its efficacy. To be
sure, Salk had performed a number of successful though smallscale trials throughout the early 1950s to test his potential vacPenn History Review
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cine, including at the D.T. Watson Home for Crippled Children
and at the Polk State School.28 Given how rare and geographically variable polio was, however, a large trial lending enough
statistical power was still needed to prove the vaccine’s success
definitively.29 Indeed, an article published in Parent’s Magazine in
1954 describes how trials carried out among both monkeys and
humans showed that the vaccine was safe and stimulated antibody production, but “at least 500,000 children must [still] be
vaccinated in order to procure reliable evidence on the effectiveness of the vaccine.”30
However, some articles diverged from the NFIP’s official stance that the experiment was testing the vaccine’s efficacy,
claiming that the vaccine’s efficacy had already been proven. For
example, an article published in Better Homes and Gardens in 1954
asserts that the vaccine has already been proven effective: “The
Salk triple vaccine…has proved safe and effective against all
three strains in some 5,000 preliminary tests.” Similarly, an article
published in School Life states that the vaccine “has already been
tested for safety and effectiveness, first in studies with laboratory
animals and then with nearly 700 individuals.”31 Oddly though,
the same article contradicts this assertion, conceding, “Whether
the vaccine is highly effective, moderately effective, or ineffective
will be proved conclusively through the forthcoming mass tests
with children.”32 The lack of agreement and clarity in describing
the scientific objectives of the field trial proves that the trial’s
experimental nature was not adequately captured in the information parents received and processed.
In addition to the ambiguity concerning the trial’s objectives, the information parents received did not adequately describe legitimate safety concerns that physicians and researchers who were familiar with the production of the vaccine had
possessed. Indeed, many doctors, including Albert Sabin who
went on to produce the orally administered version of the polio
vaccine, thought that Salk’s vaccine was not ready to be used
on a mass scale.33 Their concerns originated from the difficulty
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some pharmaceutical companies had in inactivating the virus;
in fact, Cutter Laboratories unsuccessfully inactivated the virus
during production for widespread use in 1955, unintentionally
causing hundreds of children to become infected with the disease.34 Nevertheless, there was no mention of the various safety
concerns related to the vaccine’s production in these articles or
in the material sent home from the public schools.
Furthermore, there was some doubt as to whether parents even understood the full extent of the information sent out
from the schools and the NFIP. A study featured in the article
“Parental Reactions to Communications” assessed, “‘The reading ease’ score placed the N.F.I.P. printed materials in the ‘difficult’ reading category comparable to textbook materials used in
colleges.” Since over one-third of the mothers in the study had
less than a high-school education though, the study surmised, “It
seems safe to infer that many of them must have had a great deal
of difficulty in reading and understanding the printed materials
sent to them from the schools.”35 The study also suggested that
the sources of information that the schools and the NFIP relied
upon were “middle-class oriented,” indicating that parents of a
high socioeconomic status were more likely to allow their children to participate in the trial.36 Even so, 43 percent of parents
of low socioeconomic status gave consent for their children to
receive the vaccine, suggesting that there were still many parents
who may not have adequately understood the information they
received about the trial.37
These sources were crucial though, since they were largely what parents based their decisions on; most parents did not
talk about the trial with their family physicians, who, like Albert
Sabin, may have been less biased and more alert to the fact that
there were legitimate discernable concerns relating to the experiment. A study entitled, “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation
of Children in Polio Vaccine Trials,” interviewed mothers in
1954 during the week after consent forms were sent back to their
children’s school but before the start of the trial, asking where
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the mothers learned about the trial and why they decided to allow their children to participate in it or not.38 The study found
that 41 percent of mothers who gave consent had discussed the
trial with a doctor or nurse; 61 percent had discussed the trial
with friends, relatives, or neighbors; 15 percent had discussed the
trial with school personnel; and 28 percent of mothers discussed
the trial with no one.39 Evidently, not only did less than half of
the mothers who gave consent talk with doctors about the trial,
but most mothers were more likely to talk with their friends, relatives, or neighbors instead. This finding is perhaps not surprising
given the fact that the trial was conducted at schools rather than
in hospitals or doctors’ offices. Conducting the trial in schools
forced parents to have to seek out more legitimate information
from their family physicians independently, which they would
have done only if they did not believe the information presented
in the media and sent from the schools was adequate. In fact,
almost 30 percent of mothers who gave consent talked with no
one, suggesting that almost a third of consenting mothers were
satisfied with what they read and heard from the media and from
their children’s school.
Orientation meetings conducted by each community’s
department of health did provide parents with additional information and an opportunity to ask questions to medical authorities. Indeed, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study
found that “among parents who had initially been undecided,
those who attended an orientation session at one of the schools
were significantly more likely subsequently to give consent than
were parents who did not attend.” However, the meetings were
led by health officials presumably supportive of the trial and were
held in public settings and in large groups, which perhaps prohibited some parents from asking questions because they were
less inclined or comfortable to do so in such a setting. Moreover,
the group setting most likely influenced some parents to participate through the “bandwagon effect.”40 Orientation meetings
also prohibited a more personalized discussion of how a parent’s
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child would be affected by participating in the trial. Thus, it is
worth noting that only one-third of parents who gave consent
attended these orientation meetings.
The carrying out of Salk’s field trial in schools rather
than in clinical settings compromised the degree to which parents were able to make informed decisions as to whether to allow
their children to participate in the trial. The information they
received was primarily from the media, the NFIP, and schools,
which did not fully capture the experimental nature of the field
trial. In this way, the lack of unbiased and complete information
made the trial appear as more of a mass vaccination campaign
than as a mass human experiment.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS ENGENDERING
OBLIGATORY PARTICIPATION
The use of public schools as loci for the trial also transformed the act of participating into a community deed or obligation. That is, the trial became perceived as a community event in
which all members of the public came together and played their
part in fighting against a childhood disease. Polio in particular
brought communities together, perhaps more so than any other
disease of the time; not only did the disease disproportionately
affect young children and was potentially deadly, but it also ravaged the United States at a time of intense nationalism. This
perception of the trial, which public schools had a hand in generating, had the effect of subtly coercing families to participate.
The celebration and spectacle that coincided with the trial contributed to the perception that participating in the trial was
a communal or nationalistic act. Historian Jane Smith discusses
how children and parents lined up in schools and were given the
vaccine (or the placebo) one by one, as the media took pictures
and onlookers smiled in wonder:
Whether the clinics were set up in the auditorium, classPenn History Review
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room, gym, or on the open lawn, the photographers
took the same pictures: the line of children waiting to
get their shots; the wide-eyed little cowboy sandwiched
between a nurse who held his shoulders and a doctor
who pricked his arm; the brave little girl who grinned at
the needle; and then the group of proud survivors, broad
smiles stretching the cheeks that still glistened with tears,
each right hand pointing to the left upper arm to show
where the magic shot had been given.41
In many ways, participating in the trial could be considered as
a display of solidarity with one’s community, since people were
literally standing in line together to play a role in finding a cure to
polio. The intense nationalism of the epoch also caused members of the public to view participating in the trial as an obligation for the nation’s wellbeing; just as individuals were called
upon to shoulder their part in the onerous war effort during the

A teacher’s message for her students regarding
their historic role in the fight against polio.
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Children received the NFIP’s “Polio Pioneer”
badges after participating in the trial.

Second World War nearly a decade earlier, individuals were now
called upon to assume their part in the name of scientific advancement.42 In an image now iconic of the polio trial, a teacher
stands in front of her students next to a blackboard which has
written on it: “Making History. We are among the first children
ever to be given Polio shots. So we are really making History
today. We are lucky.” This image suggests that the teacher assumed that everyone in the class was participating in the trial. It
also demonstrates how children were told that it was a privilege
to participate in the trial—just as the consent form mailed home
to parents was in fact a “request to participate form”—and that
teachers perceived participating as a classroom responsibility to
“make history.”43 Another iconic image used for propaganda
purposes by the NFIP shows children who had already received
the vaccine lined up with their “Polio Pioneer” certificates, which
were produced and distributed by the NFIP. The image is another demonstration of how much community spirit participation
in the trial involved.
This idea of partaking in the trial as a community effort
is also not so subtly expressed in the media and from the NFIP.
A number of scholars have noted how the NFIP marketed parPenn History Review
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ticipation as a moral deed; Basil O’Connor, President of the
NFIP, stated in his letter to parents that the success of the trial
depended on their cooperation.44 Furthermore, many newspaper
and magazine articles emphasized the vast number of volunteers
who were coming together to help carry out the trials; the “No
more polio after ’54?” article describes:
…country health officers, medical societies, mayors and
selectmen, newspaper-radio-TV executives, the Foundation’s 3,100 chapters, P.T.A.s [Parent-Teacher Associations], other civic and community groups—in fact, every
agency that could educate or activate—were drawn into
the program.
In size and detailed planning—right down to
trailers for the local theater and buses to take the children
to the vaccine clinics—there’s never been anything quite
like it before!45
Therefore, given how greatly the trial was marketed and perceived
as a community event and a major contribution to the country’s
scientific advancement, even though children were required to
present signed consent forms, parents were “softly” coerced into
participating as well. In other words, parents were influenced to
participate not by force but by a pervasive sense of obligation.
CONSENT: A PRODUCT OF PUBLIC
DECISION-MAKING
Conducting the trial in a public space such as schools
also caused the decision to participate to be the product of public, not private, decision-making. In other words, because the trial
was so large and in such a public setting, entire communities were
faced with the decision of whether to participate. Consequently,
parents were influenced by their neighbors, friends, and relatives,
and it was publicly evident whose children ultimately did partake
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in the trial and whose did not. In this sense, the public nature of
the trial introduced an additional component of soft coercion
to participate, since parents knew that their decision would be
known and judged by their community.
As previously mentioned, the “Parent Attitudes Toward
Participation” study discovered that parents talked with friends,
family, and neighbors about participating in the trial more than
discussing it with their physicians, which suggests that parents
either were influenced by other parents or had influenced others when making their own decisions. Furthermore, given that
orientation meetings were formatted as large groups, parents
had the opportunity to learn about the trial together and then
decide whether to participate together. In fact, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study also found that parents were
greatly influenced by the news of what counties around them
were doing: in one county in Virginia, the authors write that “the
uncertainty facing parents [was] markedly intensified by the fact
that several other counties in the immediate area had planned to
participate in the vaccine trials but, for reasons relating to the
scheduling of the trials, had decided to postpone them indefinitely.”46 The opposite—being more likely to participate because
others were participating—was surely the case as well.
It is also important to recall that, as aforementioned,
mass vaccination campaigns had been historically carried out
in public spaces such as schools, community centers, or other
popular gathering places. For example, New York City health officials carried out an enormous smallpox vaccination campaign
in 1947 in response to the presence of a novel case in the city.
As a result, about 6.35 million people were vaccinated, and about
1.2 million of them received their vaccinations at locations organized by community organizations or employers. Moreover,
companies such as Eastman Kodak, Trans World Airlines, Union
Carbide, and Wanamaker’s all brought in city health department
physicians to vaccinate their employees, and the department
store Lane Bryant offered to house clinics for the public.47 GivPenn History Review
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en that the trial was conducted in schools—a similarly public
space—this existing association between mass vaccination campaigns and public spaces had the effect of casting the polio field
trial as more of a mass vaccination campaign.
SCHOOLS AS LEGITIMIZERS OF THE FIELD TRIAL
Lastly, a subtler but still significant effect of conducting the field trial in public schools was that the authority inherent in schools and school officials helped legitimize the trial and
give parents reason to participate. As aforementioned, schools
were spaces in which health behaviors were taught for the benefit of both parents and children. To reiterate, teachers were instructed to educate children and parents about how polio spread
and what preventive measures were needed to be taken at home.
In this way, schools espoused a certain degree of authority in a
child’s health, even though they were not spaces in which doctors
practiced. Given this trend of teachers acting as a tacit authority in children’s health, when teachers disseminated leaflets and
consent forms to children to take home to their parents, it is
probable that parents were more inclined to participate in the
trial because the trial’s information derived from teachers.
Schools and school officials also acted as “gatekeepers” of participation in some instances, either supporting children’s participation in the trial or preventing their participation
altogether. For example, in describing how the NFIP selected
towns and schools in which to carry out the trial, historian Arnold Monto notes, “Preference was given to jurisdictions with
well organized health services as well as to regions where there
was expressed interest in participation, especially from school
officials, since schools would be the point of access to the children.”48 On one hand, this statement affirms that some school
officials expressed their interest in having the trial carried out in
their schools. On the other hand though, Monto’s assertion indicates that there were cases in which school officials did not want
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This publication by Polio Prevention, Inc., which was most likely an
organization lobbying against the polio vaccine, alerts readers that several
school districts, most notably the Los Angeles public schools, decided not to
participate in the field trial. Although the legitimacy of this organization is
unknown, in actuality, there were health officials worried about the safety of
using the vaccine on a wide scale. Moreover, this publication demonstrates
that school officials had a great deal of power in influencing public opinion
about the vaccine.
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their schools participating in the trial. For example, in response
to the Cutter Incident of April 1955, Colgrove writes, “Cancellations occurred primarily in [New York City’s] Spanish-speaking
communities, in which press coverage of the incident had been
highly critical, and in schools where the principal was either indifferent or hostile to the vaccine.”49 Regardless, in either case,
school officials had a say in whether the trial was brought to their
schools. Depending on what this decision was, parents of children in these schools not only were allowed or denied access to
the vaccine, but they also most likely perceived their administrators’ act of either welcoming or preventing the trial from coming to their school as an endorsement or a rejection of the trial.
In this way, the actions of school administrators also influenced
parents’ participation in the trial.
CONCLUSION
The use of public schools instead of clinical settings
as loci for the polio vaccine field trial in 1954 had a significant
impact on how members of the public perceived and understood the nature of the trial. First, carrying out the trial in public
schools prevented parents from making a fully informed decision of whether to allow their children to participate because
parents lacked unambiguous, unbiased, and complete information concerning the experimental nature of the trial. Second,
the use of schools contributed to a sense of communal and nationalistic obligation to participate. Third, the public nature of
these schools caused parents’ decisions to be a product of public rather than private decision-making, as they were influenced
by friends and neighbors and their community at large. Finally,
the authority schools held regarding children’s health—and in
the community at large—legitimized the trial. For these reasons,
the trial appeared more like a mass vaccination campaign than a
large-scale vaccine experiment.
The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis most
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likely chose public schools as loci for the trial because the civic
institutions offered a conveniently reachable population that
could receive subsequent check-ups in addition to second and
third administrations of the vaccine. Moreover, students in the
first through third grades (approximately ages six through eight)
were the most at-risk cohort of the population to be infected
with polio. Admittedly, the NFIP did not choose schools as a
means to entice greater participation, but it is important to consider the consequences of carrying out such experimentation in
this setting compared to other environments. For example, clinical settings, both functionally and symbolically, served different purposes and have different meanings than schools. Consequently, clinical settings were more appropriate for ensuring that
human experimentation was carried out in the most ethical way
possible. Indeed, from an ethical perspective, schools fracture
the doctor-patient relationship so crucial to medical decisionmaking, as conversations with physicians normally aid patients
in determining the risks and benefits of participating in experimentation. Schools, however, prevent this style of privacy and
personalization; in such a public setting, therefore, parents were
unable to make a completely voluntary decision as to whether to
allow their children to participate in the polio field trial. Without
a doubt, understanding how public schools influenced the ethics
of the polio vaccine trial will contribute to our knowledge of
research ethics and our medical practices in the future.
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The Emerging Storm:
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish
Rapprochement, 1934-1935
Otto Kienitz
In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England
traced the historic route of St. Paul the Apostle, only this time
in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of the
rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express,
steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the
Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter
snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of Ankara
in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the
morning of January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled
between the alleyways on the steep slopes of the old town.1 This
man was Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old
British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year before and now was slated to take charge of the British Embassy in
Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of Anatolia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the
railway station.2
Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks
of the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen
as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and
then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Persia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He
won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern
strongmen like Reza Khan of Iran (with whom he negotiated in
Tehran as Head of Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his
affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his diary: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know,
too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.”3 A
note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of the diplomat’s
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Sir Percy Loraine, GCMG PC (November 5, 1880 – May 23, 1961)
Educated at Eton College and then later at New College, Oxford, Loraine
served in the British Foreign Office for almost four decades, from 1904-1941.

will contained the following posthumous praise for the British
Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct
of affairs was based on his belief that it is ‘men’ that count—not
machines—in the order of human affairs; his achievements, his
trials which were those of his country, and how he set about
overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of his beliefs.”4
During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a
geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic
of Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of Sir Percy Loraine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of
European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial
and geopolitical interests in the security of the Mediterranean
Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of the nascent Turkish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious
response on the part of the status quo powers threatened by
the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and
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Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of interwar
diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s experience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish
government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while working between London and Ankara during the early years of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of the burgeoning
Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of European
diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.
THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE
The signing of the defensive Balkan Pact between
Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934,
was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of the
Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which
Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London,
Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a
regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “demands and interests of the smaller states” in mind.5 Turkey took
the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “‘neutrality’ bloc” against the carving of the peninsula into spheres of external influence.6 Because Ankara still remained at odds with the
four Great Powers over a number of territorial disputes, Turkish
policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of
the regional countries and diluting great power control in the
Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion
with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of the Eastern
Mediterranean.7 The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the
support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist
policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “organize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more
menacing threat to the stability of the Mediterranean Basin.8
Ever since the conclusion of the Mosul Crisis in 1926,
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British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly
dwindling.9 Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of Bulgaria’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question
of Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of the Turkish
Straits) to the fore.10 As Ambassador Loraine noted in a telegraph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras had reasoned, “If nations rearmed,
Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept different treatment.”11 Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its
military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearmament required Turkey to revisit the status of the demilitarized
Turkish Straits. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir
John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most
unpleasant impression.”12
The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were
similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together
against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were
concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bulgaria. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bulgarians, and the Turkish government interpreted this development as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of
Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident dragoman James Morgan reported on the deliberations of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly of June 1934.13 He described Turkish
Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats
posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:
In the light of events which have recently created a stir in
Turkey, such as the speeches of Signor Mussolini about
possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of Italian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected
Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden
decision to increase the credits for national defense with
Turkey’s distrust and dislike of Italy.14
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In front of the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting
as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending
to affairs at the League of Nations in Geneva, referenced Mussolini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled,
“Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations
of Italians.”15 The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric
of the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine
wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable
that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is
probable that mistrust of Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer
relation with the United Kingdom.”16 Loraine noticed that Italian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the
Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested interests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s
bellicosity—and the timidity of the Balkan Pact given the omission of Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish
rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly
to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.
No event is more telling of Turkey’s drift toward rapprochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild evening on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon
in a long dispatch a few days later.17 After a banquet at the Ankara
Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual
fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of
Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of whom Loraine knew
well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited
the Ambassador to join their game of poker. Loraine accepted
the offer and was inundated with a game of cards that crept on
and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He
later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obviously cast down all barriers of formality, and, without any loss
of dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and
comrade.”18 Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up
the chips at the end of the game so as to resolve any diplomatic
differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for LoPenn History Review
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raine to stay behind.
The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador
over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if Loraine
imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate”
and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did
not give me the impression of a man who left many things to
chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent impression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish
Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of
the friendly intentions of His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine
later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for
England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why
could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further
mused, “It was not merely a question of the Turkey of today,
but also of the Turkey of tomorrow…[and thus there was] no
reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.”
However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer
relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend…
Russia.” Aware of this apprehensive sentiment maintained by
Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambassador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to
Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied,
“If the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines,
then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by
this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations between Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted
ways, Atatürk added “that if England really desired this on her
part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that
effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the
following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s
poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of Persia and the
Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador
and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned
over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are
playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if we were
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united!”19
Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of
the living legend of Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête diplomacy on behalf of the British Crown, but the mystique tied
to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts
to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador
Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each evening one of the hotel clerks would send a list of those present
in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya,
and he would then make his way to the Hotel if there was anyone
he wanted to see.”20 One of President Atatürk’s modern biographers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:
The Gazi was the fount of new ideas and the arbiter of
disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table.
In one of his many stories about his parties, he ask[ed]
one of his guests, ‘Tell me what goes best with raki?’
‘Roasted chick peas (leblebi),’ the guest replie[d], knowing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ [responded] Mustafa
Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to raki is good conversation.’21
Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the
President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of Turkish
foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of
the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted
upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Britain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy
directives of His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically,
to the designs of the Secretary of State in London. Tensions
often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara
regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapprochement should take. One such endeavor was to bring British economic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged
(but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in
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the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.
THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY
While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933,
the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with
Turkey that represented the zenith of Turco-Soviet cooperation
in the interwar period.22 Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties
between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more
than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of engineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched
by parallel commitments to secularization and the development
of cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collaboration.”23 Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet
understanding in terms of self-styled anti-Westernism grounded
in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the European periphery.24 Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature
of this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the burgeoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold
eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a
twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule.25 By the time Ambassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relationship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931,
bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that
was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct
textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s
new policy of state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered
with the support of the Soviet economy, which was one of the
few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from
the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s
socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the
Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of production remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving
around state-run holding companies such as Etibank (mining)
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and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of
Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.26
Soviet economic support was waning by the end of 1934,
just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces
that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the country toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935,
definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of international
politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”27 While the
Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal
threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical
rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.
However, while the geopolitics of Europe were pushing
the Turks toward the British, the etatist policies of Turkish Minister of Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and
precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and
from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of Overseas
Trade. British merchants were still operating under the AngloTurkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey
began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause
to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impetus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of payments
with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of
economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation
agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal demand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to
free their frozen credits.”28 Because the British refused to acquiesce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from
Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is
not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934.29 Therefore, one of Loraine’s
principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the
Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.30
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In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the possibility of manipulating the British Mandate of Palestine for additional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present position is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of stuff from
Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a
significant trade imbalance that, if ameliorated, could right the
scales of Turkish commercial policy to make way for more British exports.31 Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of Trade
in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving
big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the
possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”32
Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey,
Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflating the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and London. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelmingly impressed with the necessity of protecting their interests,”
the Ambassador wrote.33 Eventually, between Loraine’s diplomatic efforts and the work of Colonel Woods in London, Britain
signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year
later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with
tariff concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and
was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor
in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation.34
Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the anticipated “sign of support” President Atatürk had beseeched from
the Ambassador over their game of cards in June 1934; a year
afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.
Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers
an overview of British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy
substantiating the sliver of opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Turkey’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried
friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with
Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with
Britain.35 Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov96
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ernment remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating commercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of a British
naval offer; and the looming nationalization of the Anglo-French
Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations
throughout much of the 1930s. Part of the debate regarding the
Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank
of England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish historian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of England] unsuccessfully
opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials
used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationalization, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s
dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer
financial ties with Turkey.”36
Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested
in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore generally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of England.
His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial
agreements and export credits) as “part of the strategy securing
Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political
stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”37
Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of 1934,
but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relationship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket Ankara on New Year’s Day of 1935. A little over a week later, Loraine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the
Anatolian highlands in pursuit of the latest news from London.
SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE
Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing reality of Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides
the translation of a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from
October 1934, which warned of impending Italian military action in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and
international conditions emerged.”38 Loraine was more skeptiPenn History Review
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cal of Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending,
“The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.”39 Still, in spite
of Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of five Italian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in
eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February
10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered
an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies
of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sovereignty of Abyssinia and the maintenance of the status quo in the
region.
It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick
up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in
the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of
the League of Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the
same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the
dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign
Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be
imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating
alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of whom
served as Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in late
1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in December about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve
and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives
abroad informed of what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns
me is the time lag.”40 The British Ambassador was acting in a
precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent information from the League of Nations was critical to maintaining
the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an
inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British
Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian
aggression to call for the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits—
this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of Italian refortification of the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of western
Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish
remilitarization of the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament
98

Otto Kienitz

The Emerging Storm

clauses within the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and of Locarno
(1925)— thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position:
Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but
preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request.41 Loraine was
caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap
that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London
and Ankara.
On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with
the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of AngloTurkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of the responses
of Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:
Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as
they could possibly be with those of the United Kingdom; that any diminution of British naval influence in
the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that
any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish
interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with
alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United Kingdom as the only possibly effective champion of peace
and security in the Mediterranean, and hencethereforth
[sic] of Turkish national security interests in those waters;
that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the
conversion of the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that
Turkey in this matter, in view of the convincing proofs
she has given of her entirely pacific and peace-making
policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to
safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced
that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her
own wider interests no less well than those of Turkey,
however minor her interests may appear by comparison
with ours.42
Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly
favored an immediate resolution of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis,
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followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish
historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the
ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.”43 Instead,
Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included
France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the stability of the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwarted quickly by disagreements among all of the powers involved.
In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such
roles in the Mediterranean” once news of Nazi Germany’s rearmament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks
remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would
prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression
vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain.44
Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of a multilateral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara
the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks
deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions
of the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the
time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report
on Turkey for 1935, “In view of the increasing gravity of the
dispute between Italy and the League of Nations, and of the
ensuing friendly collaboration of His Majesty’s Government and
Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their purpose, were content to let the question of the Straits sleep until a
more propitious day should dawn.”45
Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of
airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to reevaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras
stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It
[is] the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a
fleet [has] the last word.”46 While the British were enthusiastic
toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the
“champions of world wide disarmament.”47 Therefore, Britain
was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur100
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key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions
of remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian
Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office document from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The
prospect of a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors
conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”48
Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest
bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four submarines between 1936 and 1937.49 Britain was already alarmed by
Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politicians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of Hitler’s
orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi
German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula.50 To
prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from
turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty increased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet
inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensuing years.
The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish
Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By
mistake, the Turkish General Staff learned that Britain recently
had sold a number of warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the
Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when
the Turkish General Staff requested to buy one million pounds
in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again undermined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a
reduced number of aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda
of the bankers in London.51 Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in
1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of British commercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with
Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from
British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of maintaining a
favorable balance of trade was rejected outright by the Turkish
government. Thus, even in terms of geopolitical security, Britain
“could not put the rapprochement between the two countries
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onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even
more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine.52
What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the
realization of an informal multilateral Mediterranean security
pact that worked both in and around the League of Nations.
The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia together in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on
Italy via the League of Nations’ Committee of Eighteen, guaranteeing each other mutual support in the case of further Italian aggression.53 The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed
by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criticized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry
responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its
commitments to the League of Nations, “which were no secret
at all.”54 Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led security agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion
of the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of the
Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was
secured within a constellation of advantageous relationships.
Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s
Agreement” was the attitude of France and Britain toward Italy.
The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by
appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through
diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Mediterranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an
implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining
the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration
in the development of Anglo-Turkish relations.
Therefore, by the end of 1935, Britain was facing a strategic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out
of London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of
Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would
be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hitler’s satellite.55 These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s
conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would
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“soon revert to his former role of ‘good European.’”56 Therefore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance
bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Turkey—the joint command of the British military was reluctant
to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral
Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of sanctions from
the League of Nations and London’s trust in collective security
“have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress
on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable
strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of
war.”57 Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack
of adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern
Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive
if Italy became hostile, regardless of the number of British allies
there.”58
Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by

Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty
King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom (center), and
British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard
Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey,
on September 5, 1936.
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two maxims of strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Government took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general European war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial defense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments:
“the defense of the Far East, the defense of India, and obligations in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.”59 An
aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending
influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodecanese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal
in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian
Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan
Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi German designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of
Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution
of the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from
Mussolini” if Britain deployed its forces elsewhere.60 First Lord
of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of the few British
statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Europe. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey
into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain
control of the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to
prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of food and oil
supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.”61
While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939
in the face of war, the strategic calculus of the British navy in
the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of
Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this approach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would
identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of the entire Eastern Mediterranean.62 With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in
Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in
Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda
in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya,
and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of Islam” in the Middle
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East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score
of Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin.63 Nevertheless, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Loraine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-toeye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements
at the League of Nations in Geneva concerning the status of the
Turkish Straits in the face of the burgeoning threat to peace on
the European continent.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT
At a dinner party in the summer of 1937, Loraine imparted to his guests: “The duty of the diplomat is not so much
to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if war is inevitable, his
country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of
persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.”64 Keeping the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of diplomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as
the study of diplomatic discontinuities during times of war. The
story of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While
Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit
multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934
and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of their
advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) policymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals
while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British thus delayed the signing of any substantial written agreement
with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis instead. The British strategy of appeasement in the Mediterranean
Basin finally fell apart in the face of Italy’s invasion of Albania in
April 1939. Therefore, by the time of the signing of the AngloFrench-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939,
the European state system had already begun to unravel past the
point of no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey
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sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Republic had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the
Second World War (1939-1945).
Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a
key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it possible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and
Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Britain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and
the United States of America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in
September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away
from the small nations of Europe.65 However, such an assessment is more complicated if one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish
Mutual Aid Agreement of May 12, 1938 as a defensive corollary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in
the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was
signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric
of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s
surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in
1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in
Turkey as a guarantor of Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula,
both before and after the Munich Conference.
Without completely turning toward counterfactual history, the fate of Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed
at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality,
signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet
‘betrayal’ of the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the
map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern
flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in alignment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—
the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and subsequently pressured to bow out of the Anglo-French-Turkish
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His Majesty King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom
(center left) alongside Turkish President Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk (center right) in Istanbul in 1936. Their first meeting was orchestrated by British Ambassador Sir Percy
Loraine, indicating the success of Anglo-Turkish
rapprochement.

Treaty of 1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to
the details of Loraine’s game of cards on June 17, 1934, the span
of Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s
assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel…
friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on
the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble
on Nazi Germany in 1939.
Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should
not be discounted, especially in terms of the decision for further
appeasement at the Munich Conference of 1938. The wishful
thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the
Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of the small nations of Europe should be
measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and
influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, interests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean between the inception of Anglo-Turkish rapPenn History Review
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prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940.66
Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of his diplomatic mission
in Turkey:
[If the observer needed] any proof…of the efficacy of
the British lines of policy…shall we not find it in the fact
that the Turkish Republic, many of whose men fought
against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and
has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army
of one million men mobilized for three years to oppose
any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her
liberty.67
In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a diplomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded
in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in
part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called,
“the excellence of [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which]
might better be called the rarest of all qualities: wisdom.”68 As
one of Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of 1937 exclaimed,
“If the pendulum [of Turkish policy] was now swinging over
to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting
efforts of the Ambassador had set it in motion.”69 Nonetheless,
the momentum of Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital
could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of war; for alongside Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of poker or
diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
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“Indianizing the Confederacy”:
Understandings of War Cruelty
During the American Civil War and
the Sioux Uprising of 1862
Zachary Brown
Stanford University
For much of early American history, the general public’s
racially charged preconceptions of “Indian war,” defined by
stereotypes of guerrilla fighting and “savage” atrocities such as
scalping, were central to how Americans understood the terrors
of war. Often forgotten today though, is the prominent role this
fear played during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The fear
of Indian war allowed for clear, and often intentional, parallels
to be discerned by onlookers between the reported natives’
atrocities of the Dakota War (1862) in Minnesota (also known as
the Sioux Uprising of 1862) and the concurrent American Civil
War. The presence of Native American combatants on Civil War
battlefields resulted in the “indianizing” of the Union’s enemy,
which ranged from criticisms of the Confederacy’s interest
and success in recruiting and employing indigenous support to
censures of the tactics and morals maintained by the Confederate
military and political leadership in all theatres of the war. The
Union’s rhetoric of indianizing the Confederacy also helped to
solidify the rumors of southern agents encouraging the Sioux
Uprising.
This paper examines how the rhetoric of indianizing
the enemy influenced northerners’ understandings of the Civil
War and the Dakota War as well as the connections between
these armed conflicts. By tying Indian war and its accompanying
atrocities to Confederate policies, the northern press purposefully
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connected the Dakota War to a pre-existing racial framework
of Indian-Confederate convergence that had, particularly in
reaction to the Battle of Pea Ridge (March 1862) in the Civil
War, emerged earlier. Understanding the connections between
these two wars of rebellion provides insight into the psyche of
northern civilians in 1862 and offers a unique perspective on the
role of Native Americans during the Civil War era.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY BEFORE
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
The rhetorical strategy of comparing American enemies
to the “savagery” of indigenous populations has a long and
controversial history as war propaganda dating back to the
Colonial Period. During the American War of Independence
(1775-1783), revolutionary propagandists accused their British
and Loyalist opponents of enabling Indian “savagery”—
particularly scalping. Similarly, Tories responded in kind.
Immediately following the Battles of Lexington and Concord
(April 1775), British General Thomas Gage, then serving as
the Royal Governor of Massachusetts, published a broadside
in Boston claiming that his forces had found three British
“Soldiers on the Ground one of them scalped, his Head much
mangled, and his Ears cut off, tho’ not quite dead; a Sight which
struck the Soldiers with horror.”1 The British publication Scots
Magazine also responded to the incident by describing Americans
through racial comparisons to Indian “savages.” The magazine
declared that the Americans’ “humanity is written in the indelible
characters with the blood of the soldiers scalped and googed
[sic] at Lexington.”2
Another famous case is that of Thomas ‘Burnfoot’
Brown. A Loyalist from Georgia, Brown refused to join the
revolutionaries’ cause and, subsequently, was captured by
the Sons of Liberty. According to Brown’s testimony, he was
“o’erpowered, stabbed in many places, my skull fractured
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by a blow from a rifle, [and then] I was dragged in a state of
insensibility to Augusta. My hair was then chiefly torn up by the
roots; what remained stripped off by knives; my head scalped
in 3 or 4 different places; my legs tarred and burnt by lighted
torches, from which I lost the use of two of my toes.”3 While
the veracity of this incident and other reported confrontations
of “barbarous” violence is suspect, these dramatic accounts
gained popularity and prevalence in the press and demonstrated
the extent to which both the British in the metropole and the
Loyalists in North America used the racial rhetoric of Indian war
to demonize their American adversaries.
While British media charged Americans with Indian
savagery, most accusations of barbarianism during the War of
Independence came from the revolutionary polemic directed
against the British. Arguably the most famous of these rhetorical
attacks was the tale of Jane McCrea, the intended bride of a
Loyalist lieutenant, who was abducted by Indians allied with
the British commander John Burgoyne, and then shot and
scalped. In response to the news, General Horatio Gates of
the Continental Army sent a letter denouncing Burgoyne to
the Second Continental Congress and newspaper outlets in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, declaring:
That the savages of America should…mangle and scalp…
[is not new]…that the famous lieut. Gen. Burgoyne…
should hire the Savages of America to scalp Europeans
and the descendants of Europeans; nay more, that he
should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is
more than will be believed in Europe, until authenticated
facts shall, in every Gazette, convince mankind of the
truth of the horrid tale.4
Following its publication in Philadelphia, McCrea’s story spread
quickly throughout the American Colonies and outraged
colonists, inspiring greater support for independence. As a
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result, pro-American newspapers began this trend to “indianize”
the British. For example, in 1781, Philadelphia’s Freeman’s Journal
wrote that British support of Native Americans was evidence
that they were “the same brutes and savages they were when
Julius Caesar invaded … for it is certain their mixture with the
Saxons and other foreigners, has done very little toward their
civilization.”5 Employing racially charged language previously
used exclusively against Native Americans, the American press
during the War of Independence denounced their British enemies
as unredeemable savages who emulated, and even surpassed, the
cruelty of their Native American allies.
Americans revived this form of propaganda again
during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), as proponents
of the war often likened Mexicans to Indian “savages” based on
racist concepts of “race-mixing” between the natives and the
Spanish colonizers. For example, Senator Robert J. Walker of
Mississippi claimed that “five sixths” of Mexico’s population
was of “the mixed races, speaking more than twenty different
languages, composed of every poisonous compound of blood
and color…[and are] barbarous hordes.”6 Thus, when reports
of Indian violence under Confederate command reached
northern civilians during the Civil War, the Union press revived
the rhetorical strategy by associating Indian savagery to lambast
Confederate forces.
THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE
AND INDIANIZING THE CONFEDERACY
The most explosive incident of Native American
engagement in the main theaters of the Civil War occurred in
March 1862 at the Battle of Pea Ridge, near Leetown on the
northwest corner of Arkansas. Pea Ridge was the first major battle
to feature Indian troops, mostly Cherokee, under the command
of Confederate Brigadier General Albert Pike.7 Indeed, a majority
of the Cherokee people, one of the five indigenous nations
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known collectively as the Five Civilized Tribes, had allied with
the Confederacy after meeting with a delegation led by Pike in
the summer of 1861.8 Nonetheless, Pike, under orders of Major
Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, was pessimistic about
the native battalions he commanded. While Van Dorn favorably
described Pike’s 2500 native soldiers as “half breed Indians, and
good reliable men,” the Brigadier General later claimed that the
troops were “entirely undisciplined, mounted chiefly on ponies
and armed very indifferently with common rifles and ordinary
shotguns.”9
Moreover, the militarily inexperienced Pike struggled to
control his indigenous battalions once engaged in combat. After
taking the Union position at Foster’s Farm during the Battle
of Pea Ridge, the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles routed two
companies of the Third Iowa Cavalry directed by LieutenantColonel Henry Trimble. Contrary to Pike’s desires, in the ensuing

Plan of the Battlefield of Pea Ridge, near Leetown, Arkansas
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chaos, the native troops scalped eight Union soldiers in Trimble’s
detachment.10 Consequently, Colonel Cyrus Bussey, the chief
commanding officer of the Third Iowa Cavalry, informed his
superior, Samuel R. Curtis, the commander of the Army of the
Southwest:
[I] had the dead exhumed, and on personal examination…
found that it was a fact beyond dispute that eight of the
killed of my command had been scalped…first having
fallen in the charge…they were afterwards pierced
through the heart and neck with knives by a savage and
relentless foe.11
While the Union forces under Curtis recovered to win the
Battle of Pea Ridge, the incident at Foster’s Farm dominated
in the press. Van Dorn tried to repress and excuse the incident,
claiming through his Adjutant General Dabney H. Maury that
Curtis was “misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians
who formed part of [Pike’s] forces having for many years been
regarded as civilized people.” Van Dorn also accused Union
forces of committing their own atrocities, primarily blaming
Germans, the largest ethnic group employed by Union forces,
thereby attempting to capitalize on Confederates’ attempts to
revive anti-Hessian sentiment first harbored during the War of
Independence.12 In particular, Van Dorn employed the racially
charged accusation that captured Confederate soldiers had been
“murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be
Germans.”13 However, despite Van Dorn’s allegations Pike felt
compelled to write to Curtis personally, expressing horror at the
atrocity, and chastised his troops accordingly, issuing an order
prohibiting the practice of scalping.14
Despite Pike’s efforts to discipline his indigenous troops
after the incident, the northern press lambasted the Brigadier
General. In the aftermath of Pea Ridge, anti-Confederate
propaganda converged on Pike with the racially motivated
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rhetoric of Indian War. The most prominent source for this
propaganda came from an article in the New-York Tribune written
by journalist Junius Henri Browne.15 Browne’s melodramatic
account of the battle described Pike as a man “who deserves
and will doubtless receive eternal infamy…for inducing savages
to [perform] shocking barbarities…[ordering] scalping and
robbing…their favorite pastimes…[for] they plundered every
wounded, dying and dead Unionist they could find…[murdering
those] incapable of resistance.” Browne then emphasized, “the
[Confederate] rebels did everything…to excite them into a
frenzy giving them large quantities of whiskey and gunpowder
a few minutes previous to the commencement of hostilities.”16
In an editorial in the New-York Tribune a few days later, again
Pike was described in terms that resemble a pejorative attack on
indigenous warriors:
Pike [is a] ferocious fish…[who] got himself up in
good style, war-paint, nose-ring and all…[he] led the
Aboriginal Corps of Tomahawkers and Scalpers at the
Battle of Pea Ridge…was indicted for playing the part
of Squeers, and cruelly beating and starving a boy in his
family. He escaped by some hocus-pocus of a law and
emigrated to the West, where the violence of his nature
has been admirably enhanced…[he] has fought duels
enough to qualify…[as] a leader of savages…[he is a]
new Pontiac…and betaken himself to the culture of the
Great Spirit…[or] Spirits—Whisky being the second. So
much for Pike!17
The sensationalized detail afforded to descriptions of Pike and
accusations of Indian treachery, however, were more likely an
attempt to distract readers from the vagueness of Browne’s
account of the actual fighting:
Desperate but desultory; now here, now there, at one
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Journalist Junius Henri Browne’s fraudulent map detailing the “positions”
of Union and Confederate forces at the Battle of Pea Ridge
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moment on a hill, at the next in a ravine. Skirmishing
was visible everywhere and hard hand-to-hand fighting
in every quarter of the field. Now advancing, now
retreating were our forces; now marching forward, now
countermarching; now appearing, now disappearing, but
ever moving forward to victory.18
Indeed, in its specificities, Browne’s account of the fighting
was fictitious. The journalist’s description of the Confederate
position differed from those relayed by other war correspondents,
including Browne’s main rival, Thomas Knox of the New York
Herald, who also claimed to be present at the Battle of Pea Ridge.
To be sure, unlike Knox’s account, Browne’s article featured a
wildly inaccurate map on which he placed commanders in
incorrect locations and claimed that the battle took place in an
area four times as large as the actual battlefield. While Knox
and fellow reporter William Fayel of the Daily Missouri Democrat
did verify Browne’s claim that scalping occurred—which was
also later confirmed by Union military reports—there was no
evidence or corroborating witness to substantiate Browne’s most
extraordinary accusation: that Pike’s Indians also attacked and
scalped their Confederate allies in the violent frenzy that followed
the assault on the Third Iowa Cavalry. These inconsistencies,
therefore, support the notion that Browne was not present at
Pea Ridge and that the journalist’s account was propagandistic
yellow journalism most likely mixed with facts, rumors, hearsay,
and self-invented narratives to demonize the Confederates. Still,
to the anxious northerners who read Browne’s article, Pike was
no better than the savage natives he commanded, despite the
fact that the Brigadier General discouraged scalping among his
men.19
Meanwhile, Knox’s more accurate account of the battle
gained little traction among readers. It would take a month
until the New York Herald even chastised Browne and the NewYork Tribune for deceiving the public through “imposture more
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flagitious [than] is…conceivable.”20 But the resulting war of
words between the New York Herald and the New-York Tribune
produced only mild public outcry. In 1862, as a quick end to
war appeared increasingly unlikely, anxious northerners were
more concerned with demonizing their Confederate enemies
than obtaining accurate accounts of a battle in the distant TransMississippi Theater. In fact, by the time the fraudulence of
Browne’s account was exposed, it was already being celebrated
in Britain as a model of war journalism and being praised by the
influential editor of the New-York Tribune, Horace Greeley, as a
story that “should be placed in every National soldier’s hands.”21
Thus, while this one incident conducted by the First Cherokee
Mounted Rifles in the Trans-Mississippi Theater occurred far
away from the primary focus of the Civil War (the Eastern
Theater), it is evident that the sensationalized journalism of
Browne helped revive the rhetoric of “savage” Indian violence
as a way to describe Confederate enemies. Consequently, as the
Dakota War began in the late summer of 1862, the reported
horrors of scalping at Pea Ridge was the enduring vision of
Indian war maintained by many northerners, making the rumors
of a Confederate plot unfolding in Minnesota seem likely.
THE DAKOTA WAR AND
THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1862
Caused by a host of regional tensions between white
settlers—food shortages, treaty violations, and the corruption
of government agencies regulating Native American affairs—
and exacerbated by the military and financial pressures of the
Civil War, the Dakota War in Minnesota was one of the most
significant Indian Wars of the nineteenth century.22 The conflict
launched a period of nearly thirty years of intermittent warfare
between the United States and the Sioux, often referred to as the
Sioux Wars, that did not end until “Siouxan independence came
to its final, tragic end on a cold day in December, 1890, in the
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Massacre at Wounded Knee.”23
Despite its military and causal ties to the Civil War, most
Americans regarded the Dakota War as a peripheral event in
1862. Nevertheless, the Dakota War haunted northerners as a
powerful symbol of the disastrous setbacks that had plagued the
Union war effort throughout the year. Decisive successes in the
Western Theater, including at Pea Ridge and Shiloh, did little to
assuage anxiety over the ensuing failures of Union forces in the
East. The most prominent of these setbacks was the disastrous
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run in August at the hands
of General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.
The Union defeat was so embarrassing that President Abraham
Lincoln relieved the foremost Union commander, Major
General John Pope, from his position and reassigned Pope to
the Department of the Northwest in Minnesota to command
troops in the Dakota War.
Few Americans outside of Minnesota saw the rebellion
in the Dakota as a central concern or even understood the Sioux
Uprising’s connections to the Civil War. However, the distant
conflict emerged as an outlet for northerners to externalize their
anxiety as the once unimaginable prospect of Union military
collapse seemed increasingly possible with the threat of a
Confederate and Indian western front. Northern anxiety about
a Confederate and Indian alliance in the West, combined with
reports of atrocities from the Minnesota front, resulted in the
revival of the rhetoric of Confederate-Indian convergence that
had emerged following the Battle of Pea Ridge. Deep-seated
fears and stereotypes of Indian war among northerners made
it easy for Union magazines and newspapers to connect the
Confederacy’s use of “savage” Indian allies at Pea Ridge to the
reports of atrocities during the Dakota War.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY IN THE DAKOTA WAR
Reports of violent atrocities committed by Native
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Americans were common during the Dakota War. For example,
on August 18, 1862, following a raid by natives on the Schwandt
family, August Schwandt, recounted, “the daughter of Mr.
Schwandt [August’s sister, Karolina Schwandt Walz], enceinte
[pregnant], was cut open, as was learned afterward, the child
taken alive from the mother, and nailed to a tree...It struggled
some time after the nails were driven through it!”24 Similarly, a
female captive who was living with the Sioux observed, “A boy
twelve years of age, whose parents had probably been murdered,
fretted and cried a good deal of the time, saying he wanted to
go home. The Indians killed him by cutting him into pieces,
commencing at his feet and then cutting his legs into small
chunks.”25 While the kind of sensationalized violence typical of
this literature reflected real anxieties of white settlers and soldiers
on the Minnesota frontier, these and similar reports should be
read with skepticism. As Colonel Henry H. Sibley wrote to his
wife Sarah, “Do not believe the thousand extravagant reports
you hear. People are absolutely crazy with excitement and credit
every absurdity.”26 Nevertheless, these accounts of atrocities all
featured grotesque violence and greatly exceeded the brutality
of common stereotypes of Indian war, including scalping. But
contrary to the popular perception of Indian war at the time,
white settlers and soldiers rarely reported scalping performed by
Indians during the Dakota War.
Ironically, Union troops and white settlers were
responsible for the most well-known scalping incidents during this
armed conflict, including the scalping of the famous Sioux leader,
Little Crow.27 During the Dakota War, the state of Minnesota
institutionalized a bounty system to encourage scalping of Native
Americans. For instance, the Annual Report of the Adjutant General
for 1863, an account of military activity in Minnesota during the
previous year, disclosed that on August 7, 1862, a bounty of
$75.00 (approximately $1800 in 2016 dollars) was paid to W.M.
Allen for killing a single Sioux warrior, while on August 31,
Julius Schmidt received a bounty of $5.00 (approximately $120
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“Indian Outrages in The North-west—An American Family Murdered by
the Sioux Indians, in a Grove Near New Elm, Minnesota—From a Sketch by
a Correspondent.”
This cartoon was based on exaggerated reports of Native American
“atrocities” committed in the Minnesota frontier. This kind of hyperbolic
depiction of violence stimulated northern anxiety, fueling the rhetoric of
Confederate-Indian convergence in northern media outlets during
the Dakota War.

in 2016 dollars) for tanning a native’s scalp.28 This state sanction
of indiscriminate violence, coupled with a financial incentive,
largely normalized the practice of scalping among white troops.
In his account of the Battle of New Ulm (August 1862), Colonel
Charles Eugene Flandreau, the leading American commander in
the engagement, described how without any trepidation “a half
breed named Le Blanc lay in the grass as our men advanced, and
fired and wounded one of them…[so] a bullet sped after him,
and cut the great artery on the shoulder…[Le Blanc] was soon
finished, his head cut off and scalped.”29 As whites, rather than
natives, were the primary scalpers of the Dakota War, the kind
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of stereotypical Native American violence that the Confederates
supposedly encouraged at Pea Ridge was conspicuously absent,
belying the rumors that the Sioux Uprising was a Confederate
orchestrated plot.
Yet, despite their own use of scalping (among
other atrocities), northern whites often vilified scalping as a
sanguineous and treacherous indigenous practice. Following
the Battle of Fort Abercrombie (September 1862), white settler
Edgar Wright was found mutilated as his body was “ripped up
from the navel to the throat. The heart and liver taken out. The
lungs left on the chest, the head cut off scalped and struck in
the cavity of the abdomen with the face toward the feet.”30
Additionally, Private William Schultz was found nearby, “with
his skull smashed in, and his brains scattered about.”31 But,
upon further review, white troops had committed similar actions
earlier at New Ulm and Wood Lake (September 1862). Still, these
atrocities were not acknowledged, as evidenced by the St. Cloud
Democrat: the newspaper denounced these acts as uniquely the
work of indigenous “savages” and “demons” who sought to use
“their most diabolical and ingenious devices of cruelty” against
innocent settlers.32
While this hypocrisy was certainly racially motivated,
it was also a conscious choice to rationalize the expulsion and
mass annihilation of the Sioux. Accounts of scalping during
the Dakota War emphasized the innocence of white victims
compared to the wickedness of Sioux savagery. The St. Cloud
Democrat claimed that those scalped at Fort Abercrombie were
“void of offense toward their foe, men of unblemished reputation
against whom the Indians could have had no memory of wrongs
to be revenged.” The newspaper celebrated Wright for being a
man with a “high sense of honor and strict integrity” who had
kindly befriended the Sioux before they cruelly betrayed him.
Minnesota newspapers used the sensationalized accounts of these
atrocities to support the conclusion that the Native Americans
were malevolent “Hell Hounds” who had to be “swept from
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the face of the Earth, old and young, male and female.”33 This
kind of genocidal anti-native rhetoric remained common in the
aftermath of the Sioux Uprising, as evidenced by renown social
reformer Harriet E. Bishop, who recalled gory descriptions of
violent atrocities committed by the indigenous population and
called these acts necessary to ensure that “Indian sympathizers
may see the diabolical natures of the foe our State has had to
meet. We think it a mock philanthropy which would screen these
guilty, unprovoked wretched from merited justice.”34 Evidently,
scalping, while ironically more commonly used by white soldiers
than Native Americans, emerged as a powerful symbol through
which Minnesotans encouraged and rationalized the elimination
of the Sioux.
When news of these atrocities reached anxious Union
audiences in the East, the northern readers were horrified.
However, rather than simply demonize the natives like their
counterparts in St. Cloud, presses in New York quickly co-opted
the rhetoric established in reactions to Pea Ridge to describe
the atrocities of the Dakota War. The resulting escalation of
the fictitious rumors of a Confederate plot in Minnesota in
Union magazines and newspapers reveals the extent to which
northern audiences understood the Dakota War through the lens
of the Civil War. This can be seen in an infamous cartoon of
the Sioux Uprising published by the New York based Harper’s
Weekly magazine on September 13, 1862. Published ten days
before the decisive defeat of Chief Little Crow and the Sioux
forces at the Battle of Wood Lake, which ended the conflict’s
main military phase, the cartoon supported the ongoing rumors
that the Dakota War, and the “savagery” practiced by the Sioux,
was the product of a Confederate plot.
The image, and its accompanying caption, directly
connected the Sioux Uprising to a Confederate plot through the
long-standing tropes of Indian war that had been recently revived
through the press following reactions to the Battle of Pea Ridge.
The natives depicted in the image resemble the “subhuman
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“I am happy to inform you that, in spite both of blandishments and threats,
used in profusion by the agents of the government of the United States, the
Indian nations within the confederacy have remained firm in their loyalty and
steadfast in the observance of their treaty.
(The above Extract from JEFF DAVIS’S last Message will serve to explain
the News from Minnesota.)”
The scalping scene depicted here does not resemble most accounts of Native
American violence reported from the Minnesota Front, and, most likely, was
the product of the artist’s preconceived stereotypes of “Indian war.”

and wanton brutes” that Browne in the New-York Tribune had
described as fighters for the Confederacy at Pea Ridge: “the
appearance of some of the besotted savages was fearful. They
lost their sense of caution and fear, and ran with long knives
against large odds…with bloody hands and garments…with
glittering eyes and horrid scowls, they raged about the field with
terrible yells.”35 In fact, even though Browne’s article and the
cartoon in Harper’s Weekly depicted the scalping of two distinct
defenseless groups—Browne detailed the scalping of wounded
soldiers at Pea Ridge, while the the cartoon centered on the
scalping of women and infants—it is worth noting that since the
Colonial Period, wounded soldiers and women were regarded
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as the typical victims of savage physical mutilation. Far from an
accurate portrayal of the violence of the Dakota War, however,
the Harper’s Weekly image, like the Browne’s fraudulent account
of the Battle of Pea Ridge, was a reflection of how Americans
had reimagined the horrors of Indian war during the Civil War.
While the fear of Indian war had long been a part of the
American psyche, its renewed effectiveness stemmed from its
ability to indianize, and thereby demonize, Confederate rebels.
The New-York Tribune described the natives’ behavior at Pea
Ridge as unremarkable, with the savages having only “repeated
the outrages upon civilized warfare and the shocking barbarities
with which our early history has made us familiar.”36 Similarly,
the fact that the Sioux were scalping women and children in the
Harper’s Weekly image was merely what most American’s had
come to expect based on stereotypes of Indian war. Moreover,
the caption of the Harper’s Weekly cartoon implied that through
scalping, the Sioux “have remained firm in their loyalty and
steadfast in the observance of their treaty engagements with
[the Confederacy].” The presence of a liquor jug labeled “Agent
C.S.A. [Confederate States of America]” lying directly behind
the violent scene reinforced the notion that the Confederacy
encouraged these acts of savage violence. Upon further review,
the presence of alcohol in both the denouncement of Pike in
the New-York Tribune and the cartoon in Harper’s Weekly opens
up a series of potential interpretations. It may be a reference to
the long-standing stereotype of alcoholism among indigenous
communities. Alternatively, or perhaps, additionally, the
presence of alcohol in these depictions may seek to connect the
Confederates to encouraging alcohol use and moral degeneration.
CONNECTING THE DAKOTA WAR AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR THROUGH INDIANIZATION
While there is little evidence of Confederate involvement
in the Dakota War, the connection drawn between the Confederacy
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and the Sioux atrocities would have seemed natural to a northern
audience recently exposed to the reports of Native Americans
scalping at Pea Ridge. The attempts to associate Indian “savagery”
and Confederate political and military policies suggested that the
horror of Native American violence was principally a product
of Confederate machinations. The accuracy of the accounts was
secondary, present only to create a veneer of authenticity. Union
critiques of scalping, whether at Pea Ridge or in Minnesota, were
primarily a pretense to criticize the Confederacy for enabling and
allying with Indian savagery.
The Civil War and the Dakota War, while often viewed
by scholars in isolation, appeared intrinsically linked for Union
citizens on the home front. Northern propagandists used the
racial understandings that underpinned this rhetoric to portray
Indian savagery as convergent with the interests and principles
of the Confederacy in both politics and military leadership.
These sources of anti-Confederate propaganda revived the
racial rhetoric of Indian war that had first emerged during the
Colonial Period, and served as an outlet for northern anxiety in
the face of military defeat in the East and the prospect of a joint
Confederate-Indian front in the West.
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